CrabHao火雲豪

As General Powell correctly asserted, the American public could not sustain support for the images before their eyes. Meanwhile, the media’s reporting of these events, in a war without a front, biased American opinion as to whether America’s military was winning or could win the war. The disturbing images on the TV screen were in sharp contrast to the official reports by the government and military leadership that the US was, in fact, winning the war and would be out of Vietnam soon. But the initial reports on Tet also were misleading. In his definitive work on media coverage during the Tet period in Vietnam, Peter Braestrup writes:

如鮑威爾將軍正確宣稱，美國民眾可能不支持眼前的景象。與此同時，媒體在沒有前線的戰爭中報導這些新聞事件，以美國的偏頗意見決定美國軍方是否勝利成功或可以贏得戰爭。電視螢幕上令人不安的影像，與政府及軍方領導階層的正式報告，形成鮮明對比，其實美國是贏得這場戰爭，並且很快會撤出越南。但農曆新年攻擊的初步報告也被誤導。彼得布雷斯特拉普(Peter Braestrup)在越南農曆新年攻擊期間，擔任媒體報導的特定工作，他寫道：

Compared to the far larger attacks on Tan son Nhut air base, as well as other actions in the Saigon area, the embassy fight was minor. But because of its “symbolism” and, above all, its accessibility to newsmen, it dominated the initial Tet coverage. Moreover, because of confusion and haste, the first reports made it seem that the foe had succeeded, not failed, in seizing his objective: the embassy chancery. Even as the fog cleared, corrections were slow in coming. Newsmen, this reporter included, were willing, even eager, to believe the worst. It was a classic case of journalistic reaction to surprise.

相較於較大規模的譚孫納（Tan son Nhut）空軍基地攻擊，以及在西貢地區的其他作戰，大使館的戰鬥較為次要。但由於其「象徵意義」，最重要的是，新聞記者容易進入大使館，主導剛開始的農曆新年攻擊新聞報導。再者，由於混亂和匆忙，首次報導似乎是對手在奪取其大使館的大法官法庭目標成功，而非失敗。即使澄清報導，更正報導緩不濟急。媒體包括這位記者願意，甚至渴望相信最壞的情況。這是新聞媒體對奇襲反應的經典案例。

After Tet in 1968, the reports began to be about the difference between what Washington said versus what reporters in Vietnam saw. The media discredited military official reports on the progress of the war, thus creating a divide that would last for decades.

在1968年農曆新年攻擊作戰行動後，新聞報告對華盛頓所說以及記者在越南看到的頗有差距。媒體不相信軍方官員的戰爭進程報告，因而創造持續數十年的隔閡。

What did the US military learn from this? They definitely learned that they needed the support of the American people—trying to hide two parts of Clausewitz’s triangle from the third didn’t work. It became the story. What the military failed to see was the importance of the media as a conduit to the people. This failure was clearly evidenced in the next conflict, Grenada.

美軍在越戰中學到什麼樣的經驗教訓呢？他們絕對瞭解到他們需要美國人民的支持，但從克勞塞維茲三位一體的第三部分（軍隊），去隱瞞國家與人民兩個部分是行不通的，因而成為新聞報導。軍方所沒有看到是媒體作為與人民溝通的重要管道，這一挫敗的跡象在未來的格瑞納達衝突更為明顯。

GRENADA (1983)

If the US military can be criticized for fighting the last war when approaching the next war, the same can be said for its approach to handling the press in Grenada. The overwhelming lesson from Vietnam seemed to have been, “Keep the press out!” Grenada offered the military the opportunity to do just that. Grenada, a small island located south of Barbados in the Caribbean, presented itself to the military as an opportunity to easily control access to the area of operations. President Reagan left the decision for media access to the military and, ultimately, it rested with the operational commander, USCINCLANT, Admiral Metcalf. Admiral Metcalf banned reporters from Grenada, which infuriated them.

格瑞納達（1983）

如果美軍因上次戰爭而飽受批評，在面對下次戰爭時，其在格瑞納達處理新聞態度可以說是相同的。在越南難以承受的經驗教訓，似乎變成「把新聞媒體趕出去」！格瑞納達就提供軍方做到這一點的機會。格瑞納達是位於加勒比海巴巴多斯(Barbados)南方的一個小島，展現給軍方的訊息是，容易控制進入該戦區的機會。雷根總統尚未決定是否讓媒體隨軍採訪，而最後決定在於作戰指揮官美國uscinclant梅特卡爾夫（Metcalf）上將，梅特卡爾夫上將禁止記者進入格瑞納達，因而激怒他們。

Even worse, a few journalists managed to get a small boat to transport them from Barbados. As they approached Grenada, Admiral Metcalf personally ordered shots fired across the bow of the media’s vessel. The vessel turned around and returned to Barbados with the American media members aboard fuming. Later, Metcalf was asked by one of the reporters who had been on the approaching boat what he would have done had the reporters not changed course. Metcalf replied, “I’d have blown your ass right out of the water!”

更糟的是，少數記者設法從巴巴多斯弄到了一隻小船運送他們。他們進入格瑞納達時，梅特卡爾夫上將親自下令向媒體所搭乘的船頭開火掃射，該船連同船上盛怒的美國媒體人員掉頭返回巴巴多斯。後來，梅特卡爾夫上將被曾其中一位上船駛近格瑞納達的記者問到，萬一當時記者不改變航向，他會怎麼做。梅特卡爾夫回答：「我會將你們這群蠢蛋轟到海裡」！

Metcalf’s plan was to allow the press in after the operation was complete. But, under pressure from the press and Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey, ordered Admiral Metcalf to accommodate reporters starting on the third day of the operation, 28 October 1983.13 Of the nearly 400 journalists waiting in Barbados only journalists were included in “the first group of journalists—a media pool to be precise—[that] landed on the island of Grenada to cover what combat actions remained.” General Vessey considered this failure to incorporate the media in this operation from the beginning to be a “huge mistake at the national level.”

梅特卡爾夫的計劃是在作戰完成後，再讓媒體記者進入。但在新聞媒體及國會壓力下，美國參謀長聯席會議主席維西（Vessey）上將，命令梅特卡爾夫上將在1983年10月28日作戰第三天開始安置記者，在巴巴多斯等候的近400名記者中，只有15名記者被列入「第一批新聞記者團（精確地說叫做媒體採訪團），登上格瑞納達島報導後續的作戰行動」。維西上將認為從作戰行動開始即未能結合媒體，是「國家層級上的巨大錯誤」。

After Grenada, General Vessey appointed a commission to study military-media relations. The final panel was comprised of active duty military and retired journalists. It was headed by retired Major General Winant Sidle for whom the panel and its report were named. It’s worth noting that this panel was doomed from the start. The original concept was to have both journalists and military members on the commission. But the media organizations were unanimous in their belief that they should not be members of a government-sponsored commission.16 One might interpret that to mean that no active journalist wanted his or her name “on the record.” Instead, journalists appeared as witnesses before the Sidle panel.

在格瑞納達事件後，維西上將任命了一個研究軍方與媒體的關係的委員會。小組最後是由現役軍官和退休新聞工作者組成。由退役少將威納特賽德（Winant Sidle）主持，因而成為小組及其報告的名字。但值得一提的，這個小組是從一開始就注定的，原先的構想是委員會內既要有記者和軍方成員。但媒體組織一致認為，他們他們不應成為由政府贊助委員會的成員。一個可能的解釋是，這意味著沒有現職的記者想把他或她的名字列在「紀錄」上。相反地，記者們紛紛在賽德小組面前出庭作證。

In addition, members of the media were unanimous “in being opposed to pools in general. However, they all also agreed that they would cooperate in pooling agreements if that were necessary for them to obtain early access to an operation”. The establishment of press pools was the key recommendation of the Sidle Report and the most controversial. The media panel members agreed with the basic recommendation:

此外，媒體成員們一致「反對新聞採訪團。不過他們也都同意，如果有必要讓他們早期獲得進入作戰行動，他們會配合新聞採訪團的協議」。新聞採訪團制度的建立，是賽德報告的關鍵建議，也是最有爭議的。媒體小組成員同意的基本建議是：

When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should support the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary.

在軍事作戰計劃明顯，新聞媒體採訪團提供媒體早期進入作戰行動的唯一可行手段，計劃應支持最大容量的新聞採訪團，既實際且能縮短時間長度，新聞媒體採訪團將是必要的。

But three full pages of comments highlighting division on what various aspects of this recommendation exactly meant followed this agreed upon recommendation.

但整整三頁的評論突顯出各方面的區隔建議，意味著正是遵循此一商定建議。

PANAMA (1989)

The Sidle report was generally considered a success by the military and the press. The military felt confident that they could control media access by controlling “pools” of reporters. The media was pleased that the Chairman would formally instruct commanders to plan to incorporate the media in its operations from the earliest planning stages. But, planning for the media in Operation Just Cause translated to keeping the media in the dark to ensure secrecy and then allowing a tightly controlled media pool in country after the start of hostilities. The military provided little support to the media. Without transportation the media could not get the whole story. In their historical chronology of “War and Media”, Miles Hudson and John Stanier describe the early hours of Operation Just Cause:

巴拿馬（1989）

一般軍方和新聞界認為賽德報告很成功，軍方可以藉由管制「新聞採訪團」的記者來控制媒體進出，而信心滿滿。媒體感到高興是，新聞採訪團主席從最早的規劃階段，可正式指導指揮官規劃把媒體結合其作戰行動中。但是，為媒體規劃正義目標作戰，轉變為讓媒體在黑暗中，以確保機密，然後在敵對行動開始後，允許在國內嚴密管制新聞採訪團。軍方沒有提供媒體什麼支援，沒有交通工具媒體無法完成整篇新聞採訪。在其「戰爭與傳媒」的歷史年表，邁爾斯哈德遜(Miles Hudson)和約翰史塔尼爾(John Stanier)形容早期的正義目標作戰說：

Meanwhile the unfortunate Washington press correspondents had landed at the US Howard Air Force Base in Panama some five hours after most of the action had taken place. After a further delay of two hours, a helicopter was found to move the reporters. Demanding to be taken to the scene of the action, they were flown only into the base at Fort Clayton, from which they could see little and find out less. During the morning the frustrated newsmen were given a briefing by the Charge d’Affaires at the US Embassy, John Bushnell. One reporter indignantly described the briefing as ‘a history lesson’. At last the pool of reporters was taken to the center of Panama City, where again most of the action was over, but as they flew in, they saw smoke rising from the Comandancia, the headquarters of the PDF, and demanded to be taken there. They were told that it would be ‘too dangerous for them’ and that even a flight around the city was too risky to be undertaken.

與此同時，命運乖舛的華盛頓新聞特派員降落在美國在巴拿馬的霍華德空軍基地（Howard Air Force Base），約五小時後軍事作戰就發生了。經過兩小時延誤後，發現一架直升機載運記者，他們要求被載到作戰現場，不過只有被空運到克萊頓堡基地(Fort Clayton)，在那裡幾乎看不到什麼，也幾乎找不到什麼新聞可採訪。早上，美國大使館臨時代辦約翰布希聶爾（John Bushnell）向沮喪的媒體記者作簡報，一位記者氣憤地將這次簡報形容為「歷史教訓」。最後，新聞採訪團記者被帶到巴拿馬市中心，那裡的軍事行動皆已結束，但在他們飛行中，他們見到濃煙不斷從PDF總部（Comandancia）冒出，因而要求飛往那裡。他們被告知說「太危險」，甚至環城飛行也是無法承擔的冒險。

This treatment did not appear to support the recommendations of the Sidle Report. Media access was nearly as limited as it had been in Grenada. But the decision to ignore the recommendations of the Sidle Report by essentially excluding the media until the operation was ongoing and then tightly controlling and censoring information was made at the highest level of government.20 This frustrated reporters and, perhaps, precluded the military from demonstrating their technical and tactical competence. While live reporting had missed what was later described by Colin Powell as a “sloppy success” in Granada,21 the Panama operation was carefully planned, rehearsed, and executed.

這種待遇似乎不支持賽德報告的建議，媒體進出作戰地區幾乎像在格瑞納達一樣受限。但決定忽視賽徳報告的建議，基本上是排除媒體，直到作戰行動進行，然後嚴格管制並檢查新聞，是政府所做的最高水準。沮喪記者或許預先排除軍方展示其技術和戰術能力。實況報導所錯過的，後來被鮑威爾所形容「馬馬虎虎的成功」的格拉納達作戰行動，但是巴拿馬作戰行動是經過精心策劃、演練及執行。

In spite of missing the first hours of the invasion and subsequent sequestering of the press by the military, reporters did get out and did report. For CNN, this was its “first war as a media event.”22 This live reporting frustrated Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because armchair strategists were critiquing General Max Thurman’s operations as they unfolded. This in turn led to pressure on the White House to direct Secretary of Defense Cheney to direct Powell to pass along orders he himself did not agree with.23 Powell realized that this was the beginning of a new information age military-media relationship. He later reflected, “This was a new, tough age for the military, fighting a war as it was being reported. We could not, in a country pledged to free expression, simply turn off the press. But we were going to have to find a way to live with this unprecedented situation.”

儘管軍方錯過第一時間的入侵和隨後扣押媒體，記者真的有出去做報導。對於有線電視新聞網而言，這是其「第一次媒體事件的戰爭」，實況報導使當時擔任參謀長聯席會議主席的鮑威爾感到挫折，因為扶手椅戰略家批評馬克斯瑟曼（Max Thurman）將軍的軍事作戰。因而導致輪番向白宮施壓，指導國防部長錢尼（Cheney）去指揮鮑威爾直接通過他自己本身不同意的命令，鮑威爾意識到這是一個新資訊時代軍媒關係的開端。他之後回想，「這是軍隊一個嶄新而嚴峻的年代，打的戰爭是一場正在被報導的戰爭。在一個承諾言論自由的國家，我們不能乾脆直接將新聞媒體關掉，但我們必須要找到一種方法，適應這個前所未有的情況。」

In sharp contrast, CNN’s Peter Arnett’s reaction was filled with excitement, “The Panama story showed CNN just how alluring live coverage of a crisis could be. CNN now had the technology, the skills and money to go live anywhere in the world.” To get that live coverage, reporters could not confine themselves to press pools controlled by the government. To prepare for the next war, correspondents would need to be less dependent on the government for access, communications, and transportation. Information technologies put the reporters back on the battlefield in the Gulf War and this time they were live.

與其形成鮮明對比，有線電視新聞網的彼得阿奈特（Peter Arnett）的反應則是充滿興奮，「巴拿馬的新聞報導顯示有線電視新聞網直播一場可能的危機，是多麼地迷人。有線電視新聞網，現在有科技，技術和金錢在世界上任何地方做現場轉播。」為了得到現場直播，記者不能將自己局限於由政府控制的新聞採訪團。為了準備下一場戰爭，特派員應該較少依賴政府的使用權、通信和運輸等。資訊科技把記者重新送回波灣戰爭的戰場，這一次都是現場直播。

GULF WAR (1991)

Fifteen years after the end of Vietnam, American forces deployed to the Persian Gulf in what turned out to be an overwhelmingly successful operation. The American people were surprised that the military was so strong, so ready and so effective. Some would argue that their surprise of the American military’s prowess was due to fifteen years of biased reporting by a media whose culture had not changed to reflect the positive changes in the military since 1975.26 Others point out that the press missed the “good news” story of Operation Just Cause because the press was shut out.27 And by the time the media did get in to Panama, they were frustrated because they had missed the story and because the military did not have proper accommodations for them.

第一次波灣戰爭（1991）

越戰結束15年後，美國軍隊部署波斯灣，結果是一次壓倒性的成功作戰行動，美國民眾驚訝軍方是如此強大、準備如此周全以及那麼有效率。有些人會辯稱，他們對美軍的英勇感到驚訝，是因為15年一家媒體的偏頗報告，這家媒體的文化並沒有改變反映自1975年來正面的軍事變革，其他人指出新聞錯過了正義目標作戰「好消息」的新聞報導，因為新聞被關閉，當時媒體曾進入巴拿馬，他們因為已經錯過新聞報導，以及因為軍方沒有為他們準備適當的住所而沮喪。

Operation Desert Storm “was the most widely and most swiftly reported war in history.” In addition to being the first “CNN War”, this war also marked a turning point in military-media relations and a turning point for Americans’ view of that relationship. Colin Powell learned his lesson from the Panama invasion and ensured not only media access but that the “right” kind of spokesman stood before the camera lens before the American audience. Powell recalled, “we auditioned spokespersons. … We picked Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, as our Pentagon briefer because Kelly not only was deeply knowledgeable, but came across like Norm in the sitcom Cheers, a regular guy whom people could relate to and trust.”