CrabHao火雲豪

Powell also understood that live press conferences meant that the public would see both questioner and responder. Ever since the Vietnam war, the public viewed the media as fighting to get “the truth” from a military hiding behind a cloak of secrecy and a government spending $600 on toilet seats. During the Gulf war, Americans saw both media and military on the TV screen. Powell writes, “when the public got to watch journalists, even the best reporters sometimes came across as bad guys.” Perhaps the strongest evidence of the shift in American perceptions was a Satruday Night Live skit. Toward the end of the Gulf war the media was ridiculed on Saturday Night Live. They were portrayed as enemy Iraqis trying to wrestle Americans war plan secrets away from an Army spokesperson.

鮑威爾還了解到，直播新聞記者會使社會大眾看到問問題和回答問題的人。自從越戰以來，大眾認為媒體為爭取「真相」，從軍方背後所隱藏的秘密，以及政府花費600美元在廁所座位上。在波灣戰爭期間，美國人民都看到媒體和軍方上電視螢幕。鮑威爾寫道，「當社會大眾都看記者，即使是最好的記者，有時也會碰到壞傢伙」。或許是的轉移美國觀眾觀感的最有力的證據，是週六夜現場短劇。直到波灣戰爭結束，媒體在週六夜現場受到譏諷。他們被描繪成伊拉克人民的敵人，試圖從一位陸軍的發言人身上，獲得美國作戰計劃機密。

In general, the media were supportive of the American soldiers in the Persian Gulf. Though reporting was positive, coverage was not balanced nor did it convey the whole story on the battlefield. Journalists were more or less welcomed by unit commanders. The Army was reticent to “embedding” the media while the Marine Corps welcomed media attention. Thus, the Marine Corps enjoyed overwhelmingly good and proportionally larger press coverage for a relatively smaller role in the war. Following the war, Army Major General Paul E. Funk told a group of journalists:

一般來說，媒體都是支持在波斯灣的美軍。儘管報導都是正面，但報導篇幅並不均衡，也沒有傳達戰場上整個經過。記者們或多或少受到部隊指揮官的歡迎。陸軍對於「隨軍採訪」的媒體，表現得沉默寡言，而海軍陸戰隊受到媒體的矚目。因此，海軍陸戰隊在戰爭中扮演相對較小的角色，卻享有完全不錯以及比例較大的新聞報導。在戰爭之後，陸軍少將保羅房克（Paul E. Funk）告訴一群記者說：

When I returned from Southwest Asia, I was upset to find that people did not know the 3rd Armored Division and VII Corps had been in a very heavy fight under heavy contact with some of the enemy’s first-rate units. The story was not well told enough about the people who did the fighting…. I had requests for interviews the same day we had briefings for the attack, but I felt I did not have time for them. I did not try to avoid the interviews, but on the other hand, I did not seek the publicity either. In retrospect, I probably should have for the division’s sake.

當我從亞洲西南部回來，發現民眾並不知道美軍第三裝甲師和第七兵團，在戰況慘烈下，與部分敵軍精銳部隊重兵接觸，感到非常不高興。報導中並沒有非常詳實地敘述那群從事戰鬥的人…。我在攻擊簡報當日曾要求採訪，但我又覺得我沒有時間接受採訪。我並非逃避訪談，但在另一方面，我也沒有尋求任何宣傳。回顧過去，為了第三裝甲師，或許我應該接受採訪才對。

Colonel Barry E. Willey, then a public affairs officer, concluded, “Most military commanders would have to agree that the media coverage of Desert Shield/Desert Storm was balanced and generally favorable where cooperation, patience and tolerance were evident.”

當時擔任公共事務官的貝瑞威利（Barry E. Willey）上校總結說：「大多數的軍事指揮官不得不同意，媒體報導沙漠之盾及沙漠風暴是平衡和普遍有利的，當中表現出合作，耐心和寬容，是有目共賭的。」

SOMALIA (1992-93) AND HAITI (1994)

America’s involvement in Somalia is an example of the “push” and “pull” effects of television imagery.35 The heart-wrenching images of starving people in Somalia “pushed” US troops into Somalia coining the phrase “the CNN effect”. Within a year, the horrible images of an American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu “pulled” US troops out.

索馬利亞（1992-93）和海地（1994）

美國捲入索馬利亞，是電視肖像「驅使」與「撤兵」效應的例子，索馬利亞挨餓民眾令人心痛的影像，「驅使」美軍進入索馬利亞，創造「美國有線電視新聞效應」這個辭彙。同一年，，一名美軍士兵被拖過摩加迪沙（Mogadishu）街道的可怕畫面，迫使美軍「撤兵」。

Somalia was also an example of careful planning for involvement of the media. Some thought it was too well-planned. As the Marines arrived on a Somali beach that looked more like a movie set than a real beach, it appeared as though the Marines were posturing before the cameras under the bright television lights. Nonetheless, the reports on media access were positive. According to Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence in their 1995 report of militarymedia relations, “There were few if any complaints from the news media about their treatment by the military in Somalia or Haiti.”

索馬利亞也是一個仔細規劃媒體參與的例子，有人認為是過於精心策劃。當陸戰隊員抵達索馬利亞海灘，看起來比實際沙灘更像一部電影，似乎好像是陸戰隊在明亮的電視燈光鏡頭面前擺姿勢，儘管如此，媒體隨行的報導仍是正面的。依據弗蘭克奧科費爾（Frank Aukofer）和威廉勞倫斯（William P. Lawrence）在1995年軍媒關係的報告說：「在索馬利亞或海地，幾乎沒有新聞媒體投訴軍方對他們有不妥的待遇。」

For Operation Restore Democracy, in Haiti, the military planned to incorporate the media well in advance of the operation. Reporters were given top secret plans for the operation prior to the planned invasion and David Wood, a seasoned national security correspondent for Newhouse News, was assigned a seat on the command and control aircraft that would oversee the operation. While Powell, Nunn, and Carter were negotiating with Cedras, the Pentagon was negotiating with reporters. Could the media stay in their hotels for the first 12 hours? How about a news blackout for the first 6 to 8 hours? Ultimately, the media agreed to a selfimposed embargo on “all broadcast video depicting or describing troop landing locations during the first hour of the intervention.” The media also agreed not to repeat the use of lights for which both they and the Marines had been ridiculed for following their arrival to Somalia. “While General Powell thought it was silly, there is a broad consensus that the coverage of those landings was an embarrassing fiasco for both the networks and the military.”

海地的恢復民主作戰中，在作戰前軍方計劃結合媒體。計劃入侵之前，記者獲得最高機密的作戰計畫，一名為紐浩室新聞（Newhouse News）工作的老練國家安全通訊員大衛伍德（David Wood），被指派到指揮與管制飛機的一個席位，可監督作戰，當鮑威爾、納恩（Nunn）以及卡特（Carter）正在與塞德拉斯（Cedras）談判時，五角大廈也正在與記者談判。媒體在前12小時可以留在飯店嗎？前6至8小時實施新聞封鎖如何？最後，媒體同意對於「軍事介入的第一小時，所有描繪或描述部隊登陸地點的廣播錄影帶」內容，自行施加禁令。媒體也同意不重複使用燈光，因為他們和海軍陸戰隊被譏為跟蹤抵達索馬利亞。「雖然鮑威爾將軍認為這很無聊，不過卻建立廣泛的共識，報導登陸對新聞網和軍方而言，都是一次尷尬的慘敗」。

BOSNIA (1995-present)

In what was considered a “bold and innovative” move by the Army in military-media relations, the Army decided to “embed” about two dozen reporters in the units deployed to Bosnia in late December 1995. Embedding the reporters in the units means that the reporters lived with and traveled with a unit for an extended period of time. For the Bosnia operation, reporters were assigned to units based in Germany a week or so before deployment so that they could observe pre-deployment training. Then these reporters traveled to Bosnia with their units and stayed with them for two to three weeks. Commanders hoped that this arrangement would produce positive stories for the Army, thus, generating support from the American people while bolstering soldiers’ morale.43 Though the press coverage of the Army’s deployment to Bosnia generally achieved these objectives, it also produced some controversial stories.

波士尼亞（1995年至今）

陸軍在軍媒關係被認為是「大膽創新」的行動，是陸軍在1995年12月下旬決定「嵌入」大約24名記者，部署在波士尼亞部隊。在部隊嵌入記者，意味著記者在一段較長的時間與部隊同住以及一同行動。在波士尼亞作戰中，記者被分配到總部設在德國的部隊一個星期左右，所以在部署之前，使它們能遵守部署前的訓練。那麼這些記者與其單位赴波士尼亞，並陪同他們兩至三個星期。指揮官希望這種安排會為陸軍帶來正面的報導，因而從美國人民獲得支持，同時加強官兵的士氣。雖然新聞報導軍隊部署到波斯尼亞普遍實現這些目標，但也產生了一些爭議故事。

In December of 1995, Wall Street Journal reporter, Tom Ricks, reported remarks made by Colonel Gregory Fontenot who was commanding the first armored brigade to enter Bosnia. Ricks reported that Fontenot warned two black American soldiers that Croats were racists and he expressed reservations that the American military would be out of Bosnia within months. This latter view was in sharp contrast to the White House’s official position. The next day, the New York Times published an article in which a “senior administration official” characterized Fontenot’s statements as: “very serious remarks of serious concern. Clearly if they are accurately reported they represent bad judgment, extremely bad judgment.” The “senior” official turned out to be an officer junior in rank to Fontenot assigned to the National Security Council.

1995年12月，華爾街日報記者湯姆瑞克斯（Tom Ricks）報導指揮第一裝甲旅進入波士尼亞的格雷戈里馮德諾特（Gregory Fontenot）上校言論。瑞克斯報導說，馮德諾特警告兩名美國黑人士兵，克羅地亞人都是種族主義者，他有所保留地表示，美國軍隊將在12個月內撤出波士尼亞。這後面的觀點與白宮的官方立場截然相反。次日，紐約時報刊登了一篇文章，其中「高級行政官員」以描述馮德諾特聲明的特點如下：「嚴正關切非常嚴重的言論。顯然，如果他們準確報導他們所表示的錯誤判斷，這是個極壞的判斷。」對於被指派到國家安全局的馮德諾特而言，「資深」官員變成初級軍官軍銜。

Fontenot’s remarks and their press coverage stirred a controversy within the military. Was this promising brigade commander passed over for promotion to flag rank because of Ricks’ reporting? The pejorative title of Richard Newman’s case study that details the controversy, Burned by the Press: One Commander’s Experience, suggests that the answer is yes. However, the study itself offers little evidence to support a direct linkage between Ricks’ articles and Fontenot’s promotion potential. However, Professor Charles C. Moskos, author of numerous books on the sociology of the military, points out:

馮德諾特的言論以及其新聞報導在軍中引起爭議，這位前途似錦的旅長通過晉升為將級軍官是因為瑞克斯的報導嗎？理查德紐曼（Richard Newman）的輕蔑標題個案研究詳細說明這種爭議，被新聞媒體所傷：一位指揮官的經驗，表明答案是肯定的。不過，研究本身幾乎沒有提供什麼證據，支持瑞克斯文章和馮德諾特的可能晉升有直接關聯。然而，著有無數軍事社會學書籍的作者，查爾斯莫斯科斯（Charles C. Moskos）教授指出：

This incident has consequences beyond its immediate effect on Colonel Fontenot’s career. At one level is the question of the impact on unit morale when a respected commander is rebuked in the national media. The other is the chilling effect on military personnel when journalists are around. The message is clear: stay clear of reporters, even friendly ones, lest one’s career might be jeopardized.

這一事件的後果，已超出其對馮德諾特上校生涯產生的立即效應。當尊敬的指揮官被全國媒體謾罵，這是影響部隊士氣的層面問題，另一個層面是當記者在身邊時，對軍人的寒蟬效應。訊息很明確：即遠離記者，即使是對我友好的，否則可能會危害職場生涯。

Though the question of whether press coverage halted Fontenot’s career will never be answered, many important lessons emerged from his experience. Most importantly, the practice of embedding reporters was judged to be a success by reporters and the 1st Armored Division’s commander, Major General William Nash.

雖然究竟是否新聞報導終結馮德諾特的生涯，這是個無解的問題，但是最重要的是從他的經驗卻可學到很多重要教訓。最重要的是，記者和第一裝甲師指揮官威廉納許（William Nash）少將判斷實踐隨軍記者是成功的。

KOSOVO (1999-present)

Kosovo represented a setback for relations between the military and media. The Pentagon’s whole approach left a lot of unnecessary ill feelings among reporters, particularly those of us who have worked very hard to try to understand the military and handle sensitive subjects responsibly.

Bradley Graham, defense reporter

The Washington Post

科索沃（1999年至今）

科索沃戰爭代表軍方和媒體關係的挫敗。五角大廈的整個做法，留給記者很多不必要的芥蒂，尤其是我們那些已經很努力去瞭解軍方以及負責地處理敏感問題的人。

－華盛頓郵報國防記者，

布拉德利格雷厄姆（Bradley Graham）。

Kosovo serves as an illustration of the sharp contrast between military-media relations during war versus peace operations. Whereas during the peacekeeping phase in Bosnia the media was embraced by the military, during the Kosovo air campaign, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark issued a “gag order” that angered reporters. Clark’s policy led to numerous stories about the lack of information provided by NATO and the Pentagon. Some stories went so far as to compare the Pentagon’s handling of the press with that of Vietnam.50 Reporters, frustrated by daily official briefings that provided little information, tried to get out to the field to get the ‘”real” story. The gag order also created an opportunity for Slobodan Milosevic to tell his side of the story. Angered by Milosevic’s disinformation campaign, Clark demanded that NATO be allowed to bomb the Serb’s TV station. Following the air campaign, the military reverted back to the practice of embedding reporters in units.

科索沃戰爭作為在戰爭與和平行動中，軍媒關係鮮明對比的例證，在波士尼亞維和階段，媒體獲得軍方的擁護，在科索沃空襲，北約盟軍最高司令韋斯利克拉克（Wesley Clark）將軍下達「噤聲令」因此激怒記者。克拉克的政策導致許多關於北約和五角大廈沒有提供新聞的報導，有些報導竟然將五角大廈的新聞處理拿來與越戰比較，因每日官方簡報提供很少新聞而沮喪的記者，試圖離開前往戰地以獲得「真實」的報導。該噤聲令也為米洛賽維奇（Slobodan Milosevic）創造一個獲得媒體報導的機會，被米洛賽維奇假宣傳激怒的克拉克，要求並允許北約可以轟炸塞爾維亞的電視台。空襲之後，軍方回歸在部隊安排實施隨軍記者。

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

In spite of the heightened tensions during the Kosovo air campaign, the military and the media seem to be on much better terms than a decade ago. At the most recent US Army War College Media Day, many visiting journalists remarked that the era of “hating the media” seemed to have passed. At the very least, War College students have come to realize the importance of learning how to get along with the media. This is evidenced by the popularity of the War College’s “Military and the Media” elective. Further, in a recent survey of 927 military officers asked to respond to the statement “The news media are just as necessary to maintaining the freedom of the United States as the military”, 83% expressed agreement.

對未來的意涵

儘管在科索沃空襲期間的緊張情勢升高，軍方和媒體的關係似乎比十年前好得多。在最近的美國陸軍戰爭學院媒體日當天，很多來訪的記者表示，「仇視媒體」時代的似乎已經過去。至少當下，戰爭學院的學生已經瞭解學習如何相處與媒體相處的重要性，由戰爭學院的「軍隊與傳媒」選修普及化可見，這是大家有目共睹的。此外，在最近一次對927名軍官要求作出回應的問卷調查中，83 ％對「新聞媒體和軍隊一樣，對維護美國的自由是有必要的」論述表示贊同。

But a 1999 research effort by James Kitfield details the enduring cultural divide between the two institutions. He adopts labels for the two groups from Joseph Galloway, US News and World Reporter－the “control freaks”(military) and the “anarchists”(media).This cultural gap has grown since the Vietnam War because the military is now a more conservative, all volunteer force. Thus, the military lacks the diversity across socio-economic classes and political views it once had. Meanwhile, the formerly white male media elite has broken barriers to women and minorities who tend to have liberal views on such issues as gays and women’s rights. The two groups attract different types of people to support their divergent modes of operation. For example, the military depends on people who respect authority while a chief role of the media is to question authority.56 In spite of this gap, both sides agree that “it is very important for the military and the media to work together in the public’s interest.”

但是，一份1999年由詹姆斯卡扎菲（James Kitfield）的研究，詳細說明長久以來久兩個機構之間的文化鴻溝。他採用由美國新聞與世界記者約瑟夫基洛維（Joseph Galloway）的兩組標籤－即「控制狂」（軍方）和「無政府主義者」（媒體）。這種文化差距自越戰以來已經加大，因為全部都是志願役的軍方是目前較為保守的。因此，軍方缺乏曾經擁有的跨社會經濟階層和政治觀點的多樣性。同時，白人男性媒體精英打破從前對女性和少數族裔，在同性戀和婦女的權利自由觀點上往往有意見的障礙。這兩組人吸引不同類型的人支持他們不同的運作模式，例如軍方依賴尊重權威的人，而媒體的主要角色是質疑權威。儘管有這種差距，雙方同意「軍方和媒體一起為公眾的利益而合作是非常重要的」。

In an age of multiple 24-hour cable news networks together with satellite technology, the CNN effect will exert even greater pressures on the tension between the “control freaks” and the “anarchists.” For the strategic leader and warfighter, it is important to understand these tensions and how to balance the military’s need to control information as a matter of operational security with the media’s desire to inform the public. It is also important for strategic leaders and warfighters to understand the media as a potent force mutilplier in a wide variety of areas. Recognizing the power of television, Colin Powell instructed National Defense University students, “Once you’ve got all the forces moving and everything’s being taken care of by the commanders, turn your attention to television because you can win the battle or lose the war if you don’t handle the story right.”