TEMPO


Live, 24/7 broadcast media operations puts tremendous pressure on strategic decision making. The power of images to shape perceptions is far greater than print media and reaches a broader audience.59 This together with the speed at which a highly competitive cable news industry is bringing these images to the public is increasing pressure at the strategic level to react quickly. For example, during the Gulf War the Bush administration, pressured by images of starving Kurds, decided to air drop relief supplies and later developed a plan, Operation Restore Hope, to feed them. Even without the images, the Bush administration, “would have made the same decision. But the news media accelerated the decision-making process” by bringing the issue to the President’s attention faster. In 1998, James Rubin, then Chief Spokesman for the US State Department, answered a question about whether the CNN effect created an urgency to respond to world events by saying, "yes, there is a greater urgency to respond. The harder question is does it change your response.”


時間節奏


現場直播且一天24小時、一週7天的廣播媒體運作,對戰略決策產生巨大的壓力,塑造看法的影像威力是遠遠大於印刷媒體,並且可達到更廣泛的觀眾,加上具有高度競爭有線新聞行業,把這些照片呈現給大眾的速度,使戰略階層作出迅速反應的壓力越來越大。舉例來說,波灣戰爭期間,布希政府受到挨餓庫德族人影像的壓力,決定空投救援補給物資,後來制定一個恢復希望作戰計劃使他們免於挨餓。即使沒有這些影像,布希政府「也會作出同樣的決定,然而新聞媒體加速決策過程」,迅速把問題提交給總統而引發關注。1998年,美國國務院當時的首席發言人魯賓James Rubin,回答有線電視新聞網效應,是否創造緊迫回應世界大事的問題時說,「不錯,回應時是更加緊迫,較難回答的問題是它是否改變你的回應。」


Decision-making in a rapidly changing environment where the decision makers are at odds with the press with respect to time is a huge challenge. The media is operating on a 24- hour news cycle while the strategic leader needs time to think, to respond, and to direct action. Strategic leaders and warfighters must learn to make decisions in real time within the context of a complex dynamically changing environment. The only way to achieve this competency is continued realistic training. In the face of less time to react and think, strategic leaders must develop operating procedures that distinguish between decisions that must be made now and those that can wait.


在一個瞬息萬變的環境下作出決策,決策者與新聞界在時間上處於水火不容實為一大挑戰。媒體經營是24小時的新聞週期,而戰略領導人需要時間思考才能回應,並指導作戰行動。戰略領導人和作戰者必須學習在即時而複雜動態變化的環境下作出決策。要達到這個能力的惟一方法,就是繼續從事實際訓練。在面對較少時間反應和思考,戰略領導人必須制定作業程序,區分必須立即決定以及可以等候的決定。


Rushing to be first with the story, the CNN effect affects accuracy of information. Initial reports are often inaccurate. Take for example, the early near real time reports of the recent shooting at the White House. The initial reports were that a 17-year-old boy had fired shots at the White House and had been evacuated for a self-inflicted gun shot wound. The real story was that a 47-year-old man had fired the shots and was evacuated for a gun shot wound inflicted by the Secret Service. Strategic leaders must ensure that they do not rush to inform. Under the pressure to appear to be telling “the whole” story, leaders must take the time to ensure they do not misinform.


急於報導第一手消息,有線電影新聞網效應影響新聞的準確性。初步報導往往不準確。比如稍早接近即時報導最近白宮的槍擊案。初步報導說,一名17歲男孩在白宮開槍,並已疏散一位自我造成槍傷的傷者。真實的故事是,一名47歲的男子開槍,並已疏散情治單位造成的槍傷傷者。戰略領導人必須確保不急於告知。在陳述「完整」故事的壓力下,領導人必須要花點時間,以確保沒有提供錯誤訊息。


OPERATIONAL RISK


In the CNN age of broadcasting, information is available globally in real time. For the warfighter the potential for the enemy knowing as much as he knows is a grave risk. How does a commander achieve surprise in such an environment? In the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf achieved operational surprise by constraining press pools. In Haiti, the White House openly announced its intention to invade Haiti as part of its diplomatic strategy to pressure Cedras to back down. In Bosnia, General Clark issued a gag order; however, this order made him appear to be adopting Vietnam-era media relations. The debate on whether the military will be able to control the media or should be able to control the media in the next war continues. The key for the operational commander will be to inform the public fully without endangering the mission. If steps to control the media must be taken, the public will have to understand why it is necessary. The military can play a role in informing the public to gain their support on why such restrictions on First Amendement rights must be taken.


作戰風險


在有線電視新聞網的廣播時代,新聞在世界全球都是即時可得的。對作戰者而言,若敵人可能與他知道得一樣多,是非常嚴重的風險。指揮官如何在這樣的環境達到奇襲呢?在波灣戰爭中,史瓦茲柯夫Schwarzkopf將軍藉由限制新聞採訪團而達到作戰奇襲。在海地,白宮公開宣布其打算入侵海地作為其外交戰略,施加壓力給塞德拉斯Cedras)使其退縮。在波斯尼亞,克拉克將軍發出噤聲令;然而,噤聲令似乎讓他接受越戰時代媒體關係。軍方是否能夠控制媒體,還是在未來戰爭應該能控制媒體持續在辯論。作戰指揮官的要訣將是完整告知大眾而不會危害任務。如果必須採取控制媒體的步驟,社會大眾必須明白這為什麼是必要的。軍方可以發揮告知大眾的作用,以獲得他們支持為什麼必須採取憲法第一修正案的權利限制。


In addition to operational security, the strategic leader and operational commander must consider the impact that information availability has on command and control. If information is available to several levels of command simultaneously, the question becomes 1) who will the decision-maker be and 2) who will act. A valid concern is that the National Command Authority (NCA), as a result of the CNN effect, will have the capability and desire to micromanage the war. In a CNN War where the NCA is held accountable for tactical actions by a public media in real time, the NCA may feel compelled to become more involved as the situation develops. This happened on a small scale in Panama.


除了作戰安全之外,戰略領導和作戰指揮官必須考慮,新聞可用性對指揮與管制的影響。如果新聞在幾個不同的指揮層次同時可用,問題是1)誰是決策者2)誰採取行動。有效關注的是由於有線電視新聞網效應,國家指揮中心NCA將有能力和要求,以瑣碎的方式管理戰爭。在有線新聞戰裡,國家指揮中心藉由公共媒體即時地說明戰術行動,國家指揮中心參與時,可能會隨著形勢的發展而感到有壓迫感,這件事在巴拿馬小規模的發生。


It would be easy to prescribe a solution by requiring carefully delineated areas of responsibility (to alleviate this problem). But in reality, what is evolving is an increasingly global situational awareness for the UN, NATO, and the NCA. This results in a fluid political situation complicated by international relationships, cultural values and divergent goals. It presents an increasingly complicated challenge for the operational commander who must maintain command and control of the military forces in theater while simultaneously maintaining situational awareness of changes at the strategic level. Just as a clearly communicated commander’s intent solidifies unity of effort in the echelons below his level, a clearly defined strategic end state secures unity of purpose between the operational and strategic command levels. This places a premium on the operational commander having a thorough understanding of the military’s role as an instrument of foreign policy.


以仔細劃定責任區的方式,明定解決方案是件容易之事(以緩解此一問題)。但在現實生活,所開展的是朝向聯合國、北約和國家指揮中心,日益全球化的情境意識,這一流動政治局勢的結果,產生更加複雜的國際關係、文化價值和不同的目標。作戰指揮官必須保持軍隊在戰場上的指揮和管制,同時保持戰略層面警覺情勢變化,因而呈現日益複雜的挑戰,正如指揮官向所屬清楚傳達他的意圖,以努力鞏固團結,明確定義戰略戰果,以獲得作戰和戰略指揮層次間的統一目標,作戰指揮官深入瞭解軍隊扮演一種外交政策工具的角色,須花費額外代價。


As in the preceding section on tempo, strategic leaders and operational commanders can mitigate the difficulties of these complexities by training in peacetime. Because decisions will impact a much broader spectrum of warfare, training and education in all levels of warfare are essential. Human judgments and decisions can be rehearsed, practiced, and gamed in peacetime. In addition to realistic training in peacetime for commanders and staffs at the operational and strategic levels, this training must include members of the NCA, the media, and civilian agencies that participate in wartime operations. There will always be contingencies the military fails to predict. However, operational commanders must be practiced in interfacing with the NCA and civilian agencies under realistic time constraints. Thus, the military and the American people can count on them to be prepared in wartime decision-making situations before a live camera.


正如在前一節的時間節奏所說,戰略領導人和作戰指揮官可在平時以訓練減輕複雜的困難,因為決策將影響更為廣泛的作戰頻譜、各級作戰的教育訓練必不可少。平時人為判斷和決策可以預演、練習以及演練。除了平時對指揮官和參謀人員在作戰和戰略層面的真實訓練外,這種訓練必須將國家指揮中心、媒體和民間機構等戰時參與作戰的成員納入。永遠都會有事軍方未能預料的突發事件,然而作戰指揮官必須在實際時間限制下,保持與國家指揮中心和民間機構接觸。因此,在現場直播鏡頭前,軍方和美國人民才能依賴他們對戰時決策的情況,做好充分準備。


STRATEGIC ENABLER


In an era where “wars can be won [or lost] on the world’s television screens as well as on the battlefield”, strategic leaders and warfighters must be pro-active and innovative in dealing with the media. The satellite television age offers strategic leaders and warfighters exceptional opportunities to leverage the vast resources of the fourth estate. The media offers itself as a strategic enabler in a number of ways . to communicate the objective and endstate to a global audience, to execute effective psychological operations (PSYOPS), to play a major role in deception of the enemy, and to supplement intelligence collection efforts.


戰略推動者


在一個「戰爭可能在全世界的電視螢幕以及戰場上成功[或失敗]」的時代,戰略領導人和作戰者與媒體交往必須主動創新。衛星電視時代,提供戰略領導人和作戰者平衡第四權龐大資源的特殊機會。媒體本身提供許多方式作為戰略推動者-向全球觀眾溝通的目的和成果,執行有效的心理戰PSYOP,發揮重要欺敵作用,以及彌補情報蒐集的努力。


In spite of the cultural divisions and potential operational risks, strategic leaders must never cede the “CNN battlefield” to the media. To adopt a “control freak” attitude or to go so far as to issue “gag orders” wastes a valuable opportunity to communicate directly with the American people. It also risks an uninformed media becoming suspicious and alienated, resulting in inaccurate or biased reporting. In the face of a “gag order” during the Kosovo air campaign, Mr. Rosenthal, the New York Times foreign editor explained, “The press reflects what is going on. If the Administration is sitting on its hands and not explaining itself, we have to go to other analysts. And dissenters are always more willing to talk.”


儘管存在文化鴻溝和潛在的作戰風險,戰略領導人永遠不可將「有線電視新聞網的戰場」割讓給媒體,採取「控制狂」的態度,或以至於發出「噤聲令」,是浪費直接與美國人民溝通的寶貴機會,也會讓媒體一致產生懷疑和疏離的風險,造成失實或偏見的報導。在面對科索沃空襲「噤聲令」時,紐約時報的外國編輯羅森塔爾Rosenthal解釋說,「新聞界反映的是所發生過的事,如果當局坐擁其手,本身卻不願解釋,我們會求助於其他分析家,因為異議人士往往更願意談論。」


Instead, the American military must leverage its standing as one of the most respected institutions together with global communications to make its case for using military force on a global stage. The fourth estate offers a superb mechanism for strategic leaders and warfighters to transmit operational objectives and goals, as well as to reinforce strategic policy objectives. To waste the opportunity to explain itself in the satellite television age where the military is more respected than the media, the military risks having the images of the battle space presented to the global village, and perhaps more importantly to the American people and its troops, in a distorted manner. Inaccurate depictions of operations can have a devastating effect on what is often the US strategic center of gravity, the will of the American people, as well as the decision-making process at the strategic level.


相反地,美國軍方必須平衡其立場,以作為最受人尊敬的機構,連同全球通訊使其如此使用武力對一個全球性的舞台,第四權提供戰略領導人和作戰者傳送作戰目標及目的以及加強戰略政策目標絕佳的機制,浪費機會解釋自己在衛星電視時代,軍方比媒體更受尊重,軍方冒著向地球村呈現戰場影像的風險,也許更重要的是,以扭曲的態度展現在美國人民及其軍隊面前。不實的作戰報導,對美國的戰略重心、美國人民意志以及戰略層面的決策過程,可能會有破壞性的影響。


In addition to being able to clarify for the American audience the linkage between operational goals and objectives to strategic policy objectives, the media has potential to support PSYOPS directed at an opposing force and its population. During Desert Storm the media provided General Schwarzkopf with the means to showcase US military might directly to the Iraqi military people. Senator Nunn has often stated that live reports of American paratroopers lifting off from Fort Bragg enroute to invade Haiti directly led to General Cedras’decision to step down. As further evidence of the power of CNN, when the US military arrived in Haiti the day following Cedras’ capitulation, the Haitians warmly welcomed the US troops. In Bosnia, MG Nash “wanted to use the power of the world press to influence compliance by the former warring factions with the Dayton Accords.” The world could witness confrontation or compliance first hand.


除了能夠為美國觀眾澄清作戰目的以及戰略的政策目標之間的關聯,媒體有可能針對反對力量及其群眾,支持心理戰。在沙漠風暴期間,媒體提供史瓦茲柯夫直接向伊軍展示美軍武力的手段,參議員納恩Nunn常常說,現場報導美國傘兵從布雷德堡Fort Bragg)出發至入侵海地途中,直接導致塞德拉斯將軍下台的決定,進一步證明有線電視新聞網的威力,當美軍抵達海地當天,塞德拉斯就接著有條件投降,海地人熱烈歡迎美軍。在波士尼亞,納許少將「想要用全世界新聞界的力量,影響前交戰派系服從代頓協議Dayton Accords」,全世界都可以在第一時間見證對抗或服從。


Media reporting can have a positive effect on US soldiers as well. At a 1991 MIT symposium on “Reporting the Gulf War,” a Marine Corps representative “argued that the press coverage acted as a ”force multiplier” by keeping Marines motivated and keeping US and world opinion firmly behind the Marines. MG Nash also recognized this potential of the media to “enhance the soldiers’ morale” when he made his decision to embed the media in First Armored Division in Bosnia.


媒體報導對美軍士兵可能產生積極正面的影響。在1991年麻省理工學院「報導海灣戰爭」的學術研討會中,一位海軍陸戰隊代表證實,藉由海軍陸戰隊保持幹勁,並使得美國和世界輿論堅定地支持海軍陸戰隊,「新聞報導可發揮戰力加乘的效果」。當納許少將在波斯尼亞作出媒體於第一裝甲師隨軍採訪的決定,他也承認這種傳媒「加強官兵士氣」的可能性。


Two other important roles the media can play are to provide intelligence to the military and to report as a part of a deception plan. Schwarzkopf’s use of the media to obscure his famous left hook maneuver is well documented. However, the media’s role as a source of intelligence is perhaps less obvious. The media can be an important source of information for two reasons. First, they may be in country before operations begin, as in Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia. This gives them important firsthand knowledge of the people, its culture, the landscape, and events leading up to the operations. Second, reporters can sometimes move about the area of operations more freely than uniformed military can. “Because of their mobility, reporters can be an important source of ‘open intelligence’ for military commanders.”


另外兩個媒體可以發揮的重要角色,是提供情報給軍方,以及將報導變成欺敵計畫的一部分。史瓦茲柯夫利用媒體來掩蓋其著名的左鉤機動是有案可稽的。然而,媒體作為情報來源的角色,也許不太明顯。有兩個原因媒體可成為重要的消息來源,首先,作戰開始前,他們可在全國在海地、波士尼亞和索馬利亞。這提供他們對於人民、其文化、景觀以及引導作戰的大事,重要的第一手知識。第二,記者有時可以在作戰地區走動,比身著軍裝的軍人更加自由。「由於他們的機動性,記者可以成為軍事指揮官『公開情報』的重要來源」。


In short, the military must leverage the media as an important strategic enabler. The media provides the military the means to ensure the American public is informed and engaged. The media provides the military with a global stage to send its message and execute its mission. It also has great potential as a force multiplier, a source of intelligence, and a resource for conducting PSYOPS.


總之,軍隊要充分利用媒體以為重要戰略創造有利條件。媒體提供軍方確保美國大眾知的權利以及參與的手段,媒體提供軍方在全球舞台上,發送訊息並執行其任務,對於發揮戰力加乘的效果、情報來源以及遂行心理戰資源,也有很大的潛力。


CONCLUSION


The military and the media have significantly improved their relationship since the days of the Vietnam War, America’s first television war. Satellite technology and the proliferation of 24/7 news networks have created and increased the so-called “CNN effect” on strategic level decision-making and how warfighters direct their commands. The military must understand, anticipate, and plan for this new dynamic. Friction between the military and the media will continue to some degree in the future. As Professor Loren Thompson of Georgetown University succinctly put it:


結論


自從美國的首次電視戰爭-越戰以來,軍方和媒體的關係已有顯著改善。衛星科技和一天24小時、一週7天新聞網的擴散,在戰略層面的決策以及作戰者如何指揮命令上,已經創造並且增加所謂的「有線電視新聞網效應」。軍方必須瞭解、預期並規劃這股新的動力。未來軍方和媒體之間的摩擦將在某種程度上繼續進行。喬治城大學羅倫湯普森Loren Thompson教授簡明扼要地提出:


Even if the dilemmas of war coverage are fully appreciated on both sides and journalists and soldiers develop a sympathetic view of each other’s needs and responsibilities, friction will persist. Tension between major public institutions is inherent in the functioning of democracy, and it is not surprising that such tension is most pronounced in a setting where lives are lost and national interests are at stake.


即使戰爭報導的兩難被雙方充分理解,新聞工作者和官兵發展相互同情的觀點、需要和責任、摩擦將持續存在。主要公共機構的緊張關係,是民主制度運作固有的,這是不足為奇的,這種緊張關係在失去生命及攸關國家利益得失的場景中是最明顯的。


In spite of this friction, strategic leaders and warfighters must harness the increasing power of the fourth estate as a strategic enabler while hedging against operational risk.


儘管有這些摩擦,戰略領導人和作戰者必須管理日益強大的第四權力量,作為創造戰略有利條件,同時避免作戰風險。
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