★本著作權為原譯者所有，請尊重智慧財產權! ★ 譯者: 戴凱峰
"Leaflet" is based upon "Psychological Operations Field Manual No.33-1" published in August 1979 by Department of the Army Headquarters in Washington DC; and "Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Media Subcourse PO-0816" by The Army Institute for Professional Development, published in 1983.
「本篇資料取材自華盛頓特區陸軍部一九七九年八月出版之『野戰心戰手冊編號第33.1號』以及陸軍專業發展學院一九八三年出版之『心戰媒體副修學程編號PO-0816』。」
LEAFLET
A leaflet is a written or pictorial message on a single sheet of paper. It has no standard size, shape, or format.
傳單是單張紙上以文字、圖片或照片的訊息，沒有標準大小、形狀或規格。
· In selecting the size, shape, and weight of the paper, the primary consideration is that the paper accommodate the message and be easy to distribute.
· 在選擇紙張的大小、形狀與重量時，其主要考量是紙張能夠容納完整的訊息，並且容易傳散。
· The recommended size, provided the message can be accommodated, is a 15.24 centimeters by 7.72 centimeters (6 by 3 inches) on 7.25- or 9.06- kilogram paper (16- or 20-pound). Leaflets of this size and weight have very favorable aerial dissemination characteristics.
根據訊息的容量，建議傳單的大小以15.24公分乘以7.72公分（6乘以3英吋），重量是7.25或9.06公克（6乘以3英吋）或9.06公克（16或20磅）的紙張，這種傳單大小與重量的特徵是有利於空中傳散的。
Printed material, which includes leaflets, newspapers, posters, handbills, books, magazines, and such items as novelties, trinkets, and gifts with messages printed on them, is major means of conveying propaganda.
A propaganda message printed on substantial material is a relatively permanent document. Once printed and delivered, it can be retained and readily passed from person to person without distortion.
印刷的材料包括傳單、報紙、海報、廣告傳單、書籍、雜誌，以及其他像是廉價的小玩具、小裝飾品和印有訊息的禮物等項目，都是傳播文宣的主要手段。
印在有價材料的文宣訊息，是可以相對維持時間較久的文件，一旦印製並傳遞之後，可以保存並在人群間相互傳遞而內容不會遭到扭曲。
適度研發與設計的訊息（充分考量其形狀、顏色、規格、材質與其他外表的特徵) ，可對目標群眾產生深刻並持久的效果。
1. The printed word has a high degree of acceptance, credibility, and prestige.
2.Printed matter is unique in that it can be passed from person to person without distortion.
3.It allows for the reinforcing use of photographs and graphic illustrations which can be understood by illiterates.
4.It is permanent and the message will not change unless it is physically altered.
5. It can be disseminated and read or viewed by a larger, widespread target audience.
6.It can be reread for reinforcement.
7.Complex and lengthy material can be explained in detail.
8.It can be hidden and read in private.
9.Messages can be printed on almost any surface, including useful items.
10.Printed material can gain prestige by acknowledging authoritative and expert authors. This is particularly important in those societies where the printed word is authoritative.
優點
一、印刷字體有較高的接受度、可信度與影響力。
二、印刷品之所以有獨特的特色， 是因為它可以在人與人之間相互傳遞而不會遭到扭曲。
三、印刷品可以加強對照片與圖解說明的運用，這樣比較容易讓不識字的人看得懂。
四、印刷品可維持較長的時間而且除非外觀改變，否則訊息不會改變。
五、印刷品可在較大規模且分布廣泛的目標群眾傳散、閱讀與觀看。
六、印刷品可供反覆閱讀，以加強效果。
七、可以詳細解釋複雜且冗長的資料。
八、印刷品可以收藏並私下秘密閱讀。
九、幾乎在任何物體的表面上皆可印製訊息，包括實用的東西。
十、印刷品可以經由公認可靠與專家作者而獲得影響力，這在強制要求印刷字體的社會更是特別地重要。
1. A high illiteracy rate reduces the effectiveness and usefulness of the printed message.
2.Printing operations require special, extensive, continuing logistical support.
3.Dissemination is time-consuming and costly, requiring the use of special facilities and complex coordination.
4. As printed material must be physically delivered to the target audience, the enemy can prevent or interfere with its dissemination.
5. It is less timely than other means of communication.
6. It can be collected and destroyed by the enemy.
7.It can be altered by overprinting.
8.Where prohibited, it can readily be uncovered by search and stringent penalties imposed for possession.
9. Development and design of effective printed material requires trained and knowledgeable personnel.
缺點
一、在文盲較多的地方，會減低印刷訊息的效果與實用性。
二、印刷作業需要特別、龐大、與持續的後勤支援。
三、傳散相當費時且成本較高，需要運用特殊的設施與複雜的協調。
四、印刷品必須將實物傳遞給目標群眾，而敵人得以阻止或干擾其傳散。
五、印刷品與其他通信手段相比，較不具時效性。
六、印刷品可被敵人收集與破壞。
七、印刷品經由套印後，可以改變其內容。
八、在禁止傳單的地方，印刷品會因搜索以及加諸持有者的嚴格刑罰等而失去掩護。
九、研發與設計有效的印刷品，需要訓練有素與常識豐富的工作人員。
CATEGORIES OF LEAFLETS
Leaflets may be categorized as persuasive, informative, and directive.
傳單的種類
傳單可分為說服性、宣傳性與引導性傳單。
· The persuasive leaflet attains its objective through use of reason. Facts are presented so that the audience is convinced that the conclusions reached by the propagandist are valid.
一、說服性傳單
· 說服性傳單透過說明使用理由而達到其目標，提出事實後群眾就會相信宣傳者的結論是真實的。
· The informative leaflet is factual. In presenting facts previously unknown to the audience, it attracts a reading public by satisfying curiosity.
二、宣傳性傳單
· 宣傳性傳單是以事實作依據，事先提出群眾不知道的事實，藉由滿足好奇心來吸引大眾的閱讀。
· The directive leaflet directs action when intelligence indicates the target is receptive. It is used to direct and control activities of underground forces. It may be used to disrupt enemy production by giving advance warning of bombing attacks and suggesting that workers in enemy production facilities protect themselves by staying away from work.
三、指示性傳單
· 指示性傳單是當情報指出，目標容易接受新的思想與建議時而指導其行動，它是用來引導與控制地下組織兵力的活動，並可以用來分化敵軍的生產工作，經由進一步轟炸攻擊警告，並建議在敵軍生產設施的工作人員離開工作崗位，以保護自己。
During consolidation and foreign internal defense operations, directive leaflets assist in maintaining law and order and in publicizing government programs.
在鞏固與外國內部防禦作戰期間，指示性傳單可以協助維護法律與秩序以及宣導政府的計畫。
LEAFLET USE
Leaflets are developed for specific uses, such as standard, special situation, safe conduct, and news.
傳單的運用
傳單已發展成為特定的用途，諸如標準傳單、特殊狀況傳單、安全證與新聞傳單。
Standard leaflets contain general propaganda messages intended for repeated use in all types of psychological operations. They are particularly valuable in fast-moving tactical situations when PSYOP units are unable to prepare leaflets to fit rapidly changing situations. The content of standard leaflets used in support of foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and consolidation operations varies widely.
標準傳單包含一般文宣訊息，試圖在各類型的心理作戰中重複使用，它們在快速移動的戰術狀況下顯得特別有利用價值，尤其是在心戰單位無法準備傳單來迎接瞬息萬變的狀況之下。標準傳單的內容可用於支持外國內部防禦作戰、非傳統戰爭與鞏固作戰等，變化萬千。
· Advantages of Standard Leaflets. Use of standard leaflets:
· 標準傳單的優點，標準傳單的運用：
o Permits rapid dissemination of a variety of propaganda messages. Leaflets are prepared in advance, stockpiled in bulk, or loaded in disseminating devices for storage or immediate delivery. This provides flexibility for the use of PSYOP at all levels of command.
o Permits standardization of selected propaganda themes or messages, insuring consistency of propaganda content.
o Allows cataloging. Standard leaflets are easily cataloged. The availability of catalogs of standard leaflets simplifies the task of integrating selected leaflets into tactical operations.
o Permits the most efficient use of large, high-speed presses at theater Army level and maximum use of commercial facilities.
o Permits a joint production agency to better control printed propaganda materials.
o Allows pretesting well in advance of dissemination.
o Insures continuation of the PSYOP effort even though reproduction equipment may be destroyed or temporarily disabled.
一、得以快速傳散許多不同的文宣訊息。
二、預先準備傳單，可大量儲備或裝載於傳散的設備，以儲存或立即傳送，提供各級指揮層級彈性，作為心戰運用。
三、允許選擇的文宣主題或訊息標準化，以確保文宣內容的一致性。
四、可以編入目錄。標準傳單易於編目，標準傳單目錄的方便可用性簡化整合選擇傳單作為戰術作戰的工作。
五、在作戰區陸軍階層中，大量與高速壓縮的情形下，發揮最有效率地運用，以及商業設施最大的使用率。
六、容許聯合生產機構改善管制印刷文宣材料。
七、容許在傳散前進行完善地預備測試。
八、即使在印刷裝備可能遭受摧毀或暫時失去作用時，仍可確保心戰成果的延續性。
Disadvantages of Standard Leaflets:
o Standard leaflets are usually less effective than leaflets tailored for a specific action or situation.
o They are subject to deterioration.
o Circumstances and conditions make them obsolete.
Stockpiles of leaflets become a logistical burden and can be overprinted by the enemy.
o They endanger enemy soldiers and civilians seen reading them.
· They are instantly identifiable as a PSYOP device; therefore, the leaflet's credibility is suspect.
· Contingency leaflets are prepared for an anticipated event.
· Special situation leaflets are requested when the standard leaflet message is inadequate to exploit a particular propaganda opportunity, situation, or objective. They are developed when intelligence indicates the existence of a specifically exploitable, but transient and presumably non recurring psychological opportunity. They are intended for use only once because the circumstances which govern their preparation are seldom duplicated.
· Use in tactical operations. Tactical PSYOP achieve maximum results when leaflets have specific relevance at the moment of receipt, when psychological pressures are greatest, and when a reasonable course of action is presented. For example, surrender becomes a reasonable course of action only when under current conditions no other alternative action seems plausible.
· Use in strategic operations. Strategic PSYOP are made more effective by the use of special situation leaflets that deal with specific problems and discuss them in terms of current facts. The impact is usually cumulative, rather then immediate, extending over weeks, months, or years. These leaflets are used primarily to communicate with special targets, such as foreign workers in enemy or occupied countries, ethnic or religious groups, members of a particular industrial facility or industry, and friendly resistance groups.
標準傳單的缺點：
一、標準傳單與特別行動或狀況相比，通常是經過特別量身訂做的傳單，比較不具有效率。
二、品質容易降低。
三、無法適時配合環境與狀況的變化。
四、囤積傳單成為後勤一項負擔，同時可能被敵人利用套印。
五、標準傳單會使閱讀的敵軍士兵及平民在被發現後遭受危險。
六、標準傳單是立即可辨的心戰策略；因此，傳單的可信度受到懷疑。
七、必須準備應急傳單，以面對預期的事件。
八、標準傳單訊息無法適用於特殊文宣機會、狀況或目標時，要求使用特別狀況傳單。當情報顯示有特別可利用的存在價值，短暫推測不會再發生之心戰時機時，即可發展標準傳單。打算只使用一次，因為其準備的環境鮮少有複製的情形。
九、運用於戰術行動：傳單在接收的時候有特別相關時、心理壓力最大時以及提出合理的行動路線時，戰術心戰就會達成最大效果。例如，在目前條件下沒有其他可靠替代行動時，投降成為合理的行動路線。
十、運用於戰略行動：戰略心戰藉由特別狀況的傳單運用，處理特殊問題，並以目前的事實討論，才能達到更有效率。這種衝擊通常是日積月累的，而非立即延伸為數週、數月或數年。這些傳單主要用於與特別目標溝通，諸如在敵軍或佔領國工作的外國人、族群或宗教團體、特別工業設施或工業的成員以及對我友好的抵抗群眾。
★本著作權為原譯者所有，請尊重智慧財產權! ★
譯者:薛欣蘭
Whispers of War- The British World War II rumor campaign
戰場細語-談二次世界大戰英軍之謠言戰役
The humiliating defeat of the British Expeditionary Force in France in the summer of 1940
was perhaps Britain’s darkest hour of the Second World War. But the defeat was quickly and
successfully spun into a heroic retreat after the miraculous evacuation of the greater part
of the BEF from the beaches of Dunkirk. Britain was now fighting alone and facing a Nazi invasion.
1940年夏季英國遠征軍（British Expeditionary Force,BEF）在法國的慘敗，也許是大英帝國在二次
世界大戰期間最黑暗的時刻。但在大部份英國遠征軍奇蹟式地撤離法國敦刻爾克（Dunkirk）海灘後，
此挫敗很快並成功地轉成一場英勇的撤退。此際，大英帝國正獨自力抗納粹的侵略。
Hitler's "Last Appeal to Reason" was dropped over Britain in July 1940
1940年投散於英國的希特勒「最後呼籲」講稿
During a speech to the German Reichstag on 19 July 1940, Hitler gave Britain one last chance
to make peace. Sefton Delmer, the future head and mastermind of British black propaganda
, was just about to make his debut broadcast to Germany on the BBC when he heard the
Führer’s “last appeal to reason”. Spontaneously, without governmental approval, Delmer
tersely rejected any notion of a compromise peace. “Herr Hitler,” Delmer announced, “you
have on occasion in the past consulted me as to the mood of the British public. So permit me
to render your Excellency this little service once again tonight. Let me tell you what we
here in Britain think of this appeal of yours to what you are pleased to call our reason and
common sense. Herr Führer and Reichskanzler, we hurl it right back at you, right in your
evil smelling teeth . . .” 1 The unofficial rejection upset a few Members of Parliament
but Delmer’s attitude was indicative of the new mindset in the country.
在1940年7月19日於德國邦聯議會（Reichstag）發表的演說中，希特勒給英國下了最後通牒。當英
國未來欺敵宣傳主腦戴摩（Sefton Delmer）聽到此場演說時，他正準備於英國國家廣播電台做對德國
人的第一次播音。在未經英國政府當局同意的情況下，戴摩立即於播音中簡短地拒絕德國所提出的任何
妥協式的和平。『希特勒先生，您在過去偶爾會就英國民心狀態而請教於我。所以，在今晚讓我再為閣
下提供此一小小的服務。讓我告訴你，我們英國人對你的呼籲以及你所謂我們的理性及常識的想法。元
首及總理先生，我們絕不接受妥協，並請把你的言論吞回你邪惡的嘴裏。』此一非官方的回絕使幾位國
會成員十分不滿，但戴摩的看法卻是全民的心聲。
Sefton Delmer broadcasts to Germany
戴摩對德國人廣播
Britain’s main priority now was preparation for the expected invasion. All and every means
were explored to defend the country. Psychological warfare had an important role to play in
exaggerating Britain’s defence capabilities and to persuade the German invading force that
they were undertaking an impossible and perilous task which would only result in their
annihilation. The spreading of “inspired rumours” would be one method utilized to deceive
and depress the enemy.
大英帝國現在的主要工作是為可預期的侵略做好準備，並使用各種各樣的方式來保衛家園。心理戰在激
勵英國防衛能力上扮演重要角色，亦嚇阻德軍告知入侵英國是一項危險及不可能的任務，侵略結果只會
使德國自取滅亡。這類暗示性謠言的散佈為一項欺敵及打壓敵人之手段。
Rumors are a perfect medium for unacknowledgeable clandestine propaganda and deception. They
are incredibly hard to trace and near impossible to prove their origin; they can spread like
the proverbial wildfire. There is no one in the world who does not relish passing on gossip
or a titbit of “inside” information. Even in today’s news saturated world the populations
of the Western democracies, who believe they are more enlightened and less gullible than ever
before, still fall for the most ridiculous and often abhorrent conspiracy theories. Just examine
those who sincerely believe JFK was assassinated by the CIA or, perhaps, the Mafia, that an
Alien flying saucer crashed at Roswell in 1947, that the US moon landing was an elaborate hoax,
and even more far-fetched and absurd stories like the CIA orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on New York and that Princess Diana’s death in a car wreck in Paris was not the result
of a speeding drunk driver but an MI6 murder plot on Prince Charles’ orders! Are these
conspiracy theories just self-generating stories from the imaginative minds of a cynical
public or are they propagated or assisted by hostile intelligence services? Who can ever know?
But what it does illustrate is that when there is huge public interest in an event with
strong emotional appeal and a lack of verifiable facts, the most fanciful stories can flourish
and be given credence.
謠言對未知的、秘密的宣傳及欺敵來說是一種完美媒介。謠言難以追蹤，無法查明來源。謠言可以像野
火一般燎原。世界上沒有一個人不喜歡談論八卦或說一點內部消息。甚至在今天新聞飽和的西方民主世
界，人們認為他們比從前更是開明及不易受騙，但仍是有人會相信十分荒謬及可惡的陰謀論。看看仍是
有人相信甘迺迪總統是被中情局或黑手黨暗殺、1947年外星人的飛行器墜毀於喬治亞州的拉茲威市、美
國登陸月球其實是一場精心製作的大騙局，以及其他更牽強、可笑的故事像是911恐怖攻擊，其實是中
情局精心擘劃以及英國戴安娜王妃在法國的死亡車禍，其實是查爾斯王子授意英國軍情六處計畫的謀殺
案。難道這些陰謀論只是從一群憤世嫉俗群眾的幻想中所產生的故事嗎？又或者它們是在敵方情報網下
所設計的？而誰又知道呢？但這的確顯示當一件事情對普羅大眾來說，是有著強烈情感並缺乏可查驗的
事證時，有著最富想像力的故事就會被相信及傳頌。
British home front propaganda poster to prevent the spread of rumors
英國國內防止謠言散佈的宣傳海報
In the wartime world of 1940 with strictly controlled and curtailed news media, the rumour
potentially was a very valuable and potent weapon in influencing public opinion. All warring
nations impressed upon their own people not to pass on gossip and hearsay. Across Britain
posters reinforced the message with such famous phrases as “Tittle-tattle lost the battle” ,
“Keep mum, she’s not so dumb”, and “Careless talk costs lives”. In Germany a poster
illustrated how a “latrine rumour” passed onto one person at 2 p.m. would rapidly spread,
so by 3:30 p.m. thousands of people had heard the scandalous story. The artist, Paul Weber’s
famous illustration, “the Rumour” showing an inquisitive snake smashing its way through
an office block was also used to persuade the German Volk not to spread tales.
在 1940年戰時期間，新聞媒體被嚴格的控管，所以謠言對影響大眾觀點是一項非常有價值及有力的武
器。所有參戰國均對其人民要求不得散佈八卦及傳聞。英國透過海報中幾句非常著名的標題來加強人民
的印象，如「閒話、閒聊打輸戰爭」、「保持沉默，小心間諜」及「無心之言，殺身之禍」等。在德國，
有一張海報描述「公廁謠言」在下午二點時開始散佈，而在下午三點半時就有上千人聽到這則可笑的故
事。德國藝術家韋柏（Paul Weber）最著名的插畫「謠言」中有一條好奇的蛇在辦公大樓間游移，其目
的即在說服德國大眾不要輕易散佈謠言。
German Volk are warned about the dangers of the "latrine rumour"
德國人被警告「公廁謠言」的危險性
In the summer of 1940, as the remnants of the BEF regrouped in England and began intensive
construction of anti-invasion defences, Department EH established the Underground
Propaganda Committee (UPC) to formulate, under the tightest secrecy, an anti-invasion
whispering campaign. 2 The rumours they generated were codenamed “Sibs” – taken from the
Latin word sibilare, meaning to hiss – partly for security reasons and partly for amusement.
在1940年夏天，英國遠征軍的餘部在英國重組，並開始密集地進行反入侵防衛工事。
英國電訊部（Department Electra House，譯註二戰時機密組織，任務以宣傳為主）成
立了地下宣傳組織（Underground Propaganda Committee，UPC）」並秘密展開了反侵
略的流言戰役。他們所產出的流言稱為「喜伯」，取自拉丁字根，其意義為發噓聲，
一半是取自保密之故，另一則是純為娛樂。
Before Dunkirk only a few sibs had been developed and on an entirely ad-hoc basis. The
first rumour devised suggested that U-boat losses were much larger than the German
government was prepared to admit with only two out of every three boats returning. The
rumour was passed by Electra House to Colonel Vivian at Bletchley Park, aka Station X,
for dissemination by undisclosed means on 10 December 1939. This was followed up in
the following February with the story that there had been serious mishaps to U-boats
undergoing trials at Wilhelmshaven, owing to sabotage in the Deschimag shipyard. The
U-boat service would be a major recurrent target for British black propaganda throughout
the rest of the war.
在「敦刻爾克大撤退」前僅有少部份的「喜伯」在流傳。第一個謠言為有關德國潛
水艇的戰損數字遠大於德國政府所公布，也就是每派出三艘潛水艇中僅有一艘戰
返。謠言由電訊部傳遞給布列卻利公園（Bletchley Park，譯註又被稱為X車站，為
二戰時英國主要編、解密碼中心）的衛維恩上校，並於1939年12月10日以匿名身
份將謠言散佈出去。次年2月傳言已變成在德國維漢哈芬港（Wilhelmshaven）接受
試製的潛水艇，因受戴卻麥格製船廠（Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau
AG,Deschimag）被破壞影響而受到重大損失。在接下的戰事中，德國潛水艇一直是
英國「黑宣傳」最主要目標。
Another early rumour claimed that due to the ration situation in Germany, doctors had
orders to do away with hospitalised old and permanently disabled patients. In the Spring,
three more fabricated stories were spread by Bletchley Park and by agents of SIS’s
Section D. The first was an economic warfare rumour which asserted that certain Germans
who had made a habit of noting the serial numbers of bank notes had discovered two
notes with the same numbers. The implication being that the Reichsbank was disguising
massive economic inflation by printing twice as many bank notes and was attempting to
hide the fact by repeating serial numbers. Another suggested that the receipt of large food
parcels from abroad by Germans was being taken by the Gestapo as proof that the
recipients had money in a foreign country.
有關配糧的問題則是另一項早期散佈的謠言，謠言指出德國醫生接獲命令殺害老殘
病患。在1940年春天，又有三個偽造的謠言由布列卻利公園及秘密情報處D小組散
佈。第一個是有關經濟戰的謠言，其聲稱部分德國人民發現銀行報表有出現兩組相
同的數字。其隱藏意涵為德國央行（Reichsbank）將同一筆帳款列印二次，以掩飾國
內通貨膨脹的問題。另一個謠言是有關「蓋世太保」接收外國的大型食品包裹，謠
言指出接收者在國外擁有大量現金。
As the Battle of Britain got underway the UPC’s work became more organized and more
urgent. Their brief was to mislead the German General Staff into thinking they have to
take precautions against non-existent weapons and to circulate news to the determent of
the morale of the German invasion force. The first anti-invasion rumours were prepared in
mid-July, several of which claimed that Britain had new and decisive weapons waiting to
be unleashed. One alleged weapon was a high-capacity light machine gun with a rapid
rate of fire and special sights to give it great accuracy. It was particularly effective at
shooting down dive-bombers, was the claim. When tested in France in one day it brought
down twelve dive-bombers and the next day two more before breakfast. To help the story
spread photographs of a modified BREN gun with mocked-up sights would be
accidentally released to the press without comment.
在英國參戰期間，地下宣傳組織的工作變得更為緊急。他們的任務是使德軍總部相信他們得去預防一些不存在的武器並持續散佈流言以打擊德軍士氣。第一批反侵略謠言是在7月中旬發佈的，多數謠言指出英軍已具有新式及精密的武器。其中一項武器為高容量彈匣輕機槍，其可快速發射及精確瞄準。據稱其對於轟炸機之射擊尤具效果。在法國測試時，第一天內擊落12架轟炸機，第二天在早餐前即擊落14架。為了加速謠言的散播，一挺改良後輕機槍的照片未加任何說明地偶然出現在報紙上。
A new deadly mine of terrific power specially designed for destroying several
landing-craft at once was another of Britain’s imaginary secret weapons. The UPC
recommended that more flavour could be given to the story if photographs were released
of soldiers lowering disguised manhole covers on ropes into the sea from small boats.
This could be continually repeated along the coastline under Luftwaffe aerial observation.
If any enemy troops were lucky enough to actually get ashore then other special mines on
the beaches controlled by “secret rays” should finish them off. But if not, the trip wires
armed with allsorts of lethal devices would. The “ultimate rumour” suggested that Britain
had an immense number of armoured vehicles capable of charging down transport planes
on the ground. The truth, however, was that there were practically no armoured vehicles
of any kind.
一款威力強大、致命性且用來催毀登陸艦的地雷也是英國虛構的秘密武器。地下宣
傳組織建議，假如發佈的照片中，有士兵從小船將偽裝人孔蓋用繩索降低拋入海中，
更可增加新聞報導的可信度。這項謠言在德國空軍的觀察下不斷地散播。假如有任
何敵軍部隊幸運地抵達海岸，灘岸上的他種地雷則會將其殲滅，以保護這項秘密武
器。假若仍無法完全殲滅敵軍，其他的致命陷阱則會產生功能。而英國的終極謠言
則是英軍具大量的重型輸具，可直接在地面運輸飛機。但事實上，英軍是幾乎沒有
重型輸具。
In the countryside a number of post boxes on the corner of road junctions were sealed off
by the Post Office. A rumour to explain this was circulated. The post boxes have been
filled with explosives and would be detonated if German troops were ever to pass through
the junction. To deter parachutists, another sib contended that, overhead telegraph wires
included a high-tension cable designed to electrocute any descending paratroopers
unlucky enough to get caught up in them. One of the more realistic tales revealed that
huge imports of Thompson submachine guns were arriving at British ports and were being
despatched rapidly across the country. What these anti-invasion rumours painfully
illustrate is how under-equipped and ill prepared for war the British army were in the
summer of 1940. 5
在郊區，由郵局將路口轉角處為數不少的郵箱相連接起來。另一則謠言顯示謠言是
相互連結的。郵箱被填入了爆裂物，當德軍部隊通過時即會被引爆。另有一則嚇阻
傘兵空降的「喜伯」，它指出電報線路及高壓電纜均是通電，若有任何傘兵接觸到立
即會觸電致死。其中有一項較實際的謠言是英軍進口了大量的湯普生手提機關槍並
快速地配發至各部隊使用。然而，此項反侵略謠言反而清楚的點出英軍於1940年夏
天時，部隊是嚴重缺裝的。
At the Underground Propaganda Committee meeting on Friday, 27 September 1940
probably the most famous and wide reaching rumour of the war was submitted. The
essence of the rumour was that Britain had a secret weapon which could set the sea on
fire, engulfing enemy invading barges on their cross Channel trip. The text of the actual
rumour is more explicit:
在1940年9月27日地下宣傳組織召開的會議中，產出了也許是戰爭期間最有名及
廣泛流傳的謠言。其內容是英軍具有一項可使海洋引燃的秘密武器，當敵軍準備跨
海攻擊時它可吞沒敵入侵船團。實際謠言描述的更為清楚，其內容如后：
The British have a new weapon. It is a mine to be dropped from aircraft. In distinction
from other mines, however, it does not explode, but spreads a very thin film of highly
inflammable and volatile liquid over the surface of the water for an enormous area. The
mine’s further action then ignites this liquid provoking a terrible flame. 6
英國有了一項新武器。它是項可由飛機上投下的雷彈。它與其他雷彈不同之處在於
它並不爆炸，而是它會散佈一層易燃及易揮發的薄膜於海面上。接下來它便會引燃
並造成一場巨燄。
According to John Baker White in his autobiography of his wartime career, The Big Lie,
he submitted this rumour to the UPC after a visit to St. Margaret’s Bay, near Dover, on the
southeast coast of England. 7 He witnessed a demonstration of a genuine anti-invasion
weapon installed across the beaches. Pipes had been buried under the beach down to the
low water mark and where designed like a wheat field irrigation system but instead of
spraying water onto crops their purpose was to shower invading enemy troops with
burning gasoline. The demonstration was highly impressive with enormous flames
shooting out across the beaches with masses of billowing black acrid smoke. In reality the
under-the-beach flamethrower may have been a lame duck being easily put out of action
with a few mortar rounds. But Baker White noticed the psychological effect upon the
under-strength troops defending the area; it certainly boosted their morale. What if there
was a weapon capable of actually igniting a wide expanse of sea, he conjectured. There
was no such weapon but if the Germans could be persuaded to believe there was, it could
have a real adverse effect on the morale of the invasion force and additionally sustain the
morale of the defending British troops and civilians on the home front.
懷特（John Baker White）依其戰時工作內容，所著的自傳「大謊言」一書中提到，
此一謠言是地下宣傳組織在參訪了英國東南部多芬的聖馬格麗特灣時所被啟發的。
他現場目擊於海灘上展示的一項反攻武器。管路被深埋於海灘下方，並將其設計成
類似麥田灌溉系統，但其灑到敵人身上的並不是水，而是易燃的汽油。此項展示出
令人印象深刻的巨燄及翻騰嗆鼻的濃煙。事實上，在海灘下方的噴火器僅是一項跛
腳裝備，其可輕易地以迫擊砲轟毀。但懷特注意到此一展示對當地防衛部隊心理上
的影響，它明顯地提高部隊士氣。於是乎他便假設有一種武器可以在廣大的海面上
引燃。當然事實上這項武器是不存在的，但假若可以說服德軍相信，那將可嚴重地
打擊德軍的戰鬥意志，此外還能振奮英國部隊及百姓的士氣。
The rumour he submitted to the UPC was sent for clearance to the Inter-Services Security
Board (ISSB) who were responsible for clearing rumours and had power of veto over any
of a military nature which might inadvertently be a real security risk. The rumours would
then be scrutinized by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Rumours of a purely
propaganda nature had to be submitted to the Foreign Office instead. This longwinded
vetting procedure was a constant headache for the UPC and they unsuccessfully
requested on several occasions for it to be dropped. Very many of the rumours suggested
by the UPC were blocked either by the ISSB or Foreign Office and probably, considering
their often outlandish nature, quite rightly so. But Baker White’s “setting the sea on fire”
rumour was given the go-ahead albeit with the unenthusiastic comment, “No objection,
but we think it a pretty poor effort”.
懷特將此一想法透過地下宣傳組織交由「軍事情報部（Inter-Services Security
Board,ISSB）」審查，「軍事情報部」為負責澄清謠言，也負責所有軍事行動的情報
安全工作之組織。謠言將會被「聯戰情報委員會（Joint Intelligence Committee, JIC）」
詳加審查。若謠言僅具宣傳特質將被交由外交部處理。冗長的審查程序常使地下宣
傳組織困擾，而且其申請常遭駁回。許多由地下宣傳組織所提出謠言不是被「軍事
情報部」就是被外交部回絕。但懷特的「在海面上放火」乙案儘管上層沒有很高的
評價，但仍表示『不反對，但認為是一個相當糟糕的點子』。
At first the story did not make much of an impact. Then, according to Baker White, came
“two wonderful strokes of luck”. The RAF were bombing the German invasion barges in
Calais with incendiaries and on one occasion were “fortunate” to hit a battalion of soldiers
conducting a practice invasion exercise. The incendiaries inflicted terrible burns on many
of the soldiers. The second piece of good luck was that the wounded soldiers were sent to
Paris for specialised medical treatment. The rumour had already been disseminated in
Paris. The arrival of the badly burnt soldiers fuelled the flames, so to speak! Burnt corpses
also washed ashore in Northern France. In Britain as well there were numerous stories
circulating of burnt bodies in German Army uniforms being washed up along the English
southeast coast. 8 Both in France and in Britain a new self-generating rumour formed
telling how the Germans had launched an abortive invasion attempt repelled by Britain
setting the English Channel on fire; a rumour that is still believed by some to this very
day. Afterwards, Baker White says, the French resistance would amuse themselves by
pretending to warm their hands on German soldiers sitting next to them in cafes and
restaurants. The first evidence obtained that the story was circulating amongst German
troops came from a captured Luftwaffe pilot who admitted during interrogation that is was
common knowledge amongst his squadron that the English had burning sea defences.
第一則故事並沒有造成很大的衝擊。後來，據懷特所述，幸運之神降臨了兩次。英
國皇家空軍（Royal Air Force, RAF）於開萊斯（Calais）攻擊德國入侵駁船時，巧合
地轟炸了一個營的兵力。此次縱火燒傷了許多士兵。第二次好運則是受傷的士兵被
送到巴黎接受加護治療。於是此一謠言便在巴黎散佈開來了。受傷的士兵對引起其
燒傷的大火加油添醋。也有被燒焦的屍體被沖上了法國北部海岸。而在英國，也傳
說有許多身穿德軍制服的燒傷屍體被沖上英國東南部海岸。在英法均有自行產生的
謠言，傳言德國人被英軍在英吉利海峽放火，以致其攻擊行動早夭，這些流言至今
一直都有人相信。隨後，懷特指出法國的抵抗活動將娛樂自己所扮溫暖的手，對德
軍士兵坐在旁邊，他們在咖啡館和餐館。第一次獲證此則故事於德軍部隊中流傳，
是由一受俘的德國空軍飛行員的審問中證實，該中隊官兵普遍相信英軍可於海上放
火攻擊。
★本著作權為原譯者所有，請尊重智慧財產權! ★
譯者:
戴凱峰自越戰發生美國第一場電視媒體戰爭以來，軍方和媒體雙方關係都已顯著改善。從越南戰爭開始，指揮官必須面對新的挑戰－面對電視鏡頭指揮其所屬單位。今天，戰略領導人可能會發現自己必須在全球舞台永遠閃爍的直播鏡頭前指揮命令。由於一週7天、一天24小時的衛星技術及其擴散，在戰略決策層面和作戰指揮方式上，已形成並增加所謂「美國有線電視新聞網效應」。軍方必須全面理解、準確預期並為這一新的動力計劃。本文紀錄自越戰到今天軍方與媒體的關係，並探討從越南到今天媒體作為潛在作戰風險以及創造戰略條件來源，未來軍方和媒體的磨擦將在一定程度上繼續發生。儘管這樣，戰略領導人和戰鬥人員必須充分利用日益強大的第四權，成為一項戰略推動者，而避免其作戰風險。
THE CNN EFFECT: STRATEGIC ENABLER OR OPERATIONAL RISK?
The process by which warfighters assemble information, analyze it, make decisions, and direct their commands has challenged men since the beginning of warfare. Beginning with the Vietnam War, commanders faced a new challenge. directing their units before a television camera. And today, commanders at all levels can count on operating “24/7”1 on a global stage
before a live camera that never blinks. Naturally, this changed environment will have a profound effect on how strategic leaders make their decisions and how warfighters direct their commands.
美國有線電視新聞網效應：創造戰略有利條件或徒增作戰風險？
自戰爭之始，作戰者收集資訊、分析、作決策，並直接指揮命令的過程，已對人形成挑戰。從越戰開始，指揮官面對新的挑戰－面對電視鏡頭指揮其所屬單位。而今天，各級指揮官可以在全球舞台前，指望經營「一週7天、一天24小時」永遠閃爍的照相機。當然，這個環境的變化，對戰略領導人如何作出他們的決策和作戰者如何指揮命令產生深刻影響。
The impact of this kind of media coverage has been dubbed “The CNN effect.” The term was born in controversy. President Bush’s decision to place troops in Somalia after viewing media coverage of starving refugees was sharply questioned. Were American interests really at stake? Was CNN deciding where the military goes next? Less than a year later, shortly following the broadcast pictures of a dead American serviceman being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, President Clinton’s decision to withdraw US troops seemed to confirm the power of CNN. Today, with the proliferation of “24/7” news networks, the impact of CNN alone has been diminished. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, “The CNN effect” is synonymous with the collective impact of all real time news coverage.
這種媒體報導的影響，已被稱為「美國有線電視新聞效應」。這個名詞產生於爭議。布希總統的決定將軍隊派駐在索馬利亞，在觀看媒體報導難民挨餓後，而遭受尖銳的質疑。當時美國利益真的是在危及關頭嗎？美國有線電視新聞網在決定軍隊下一步怎麼走嗎？不到一年後，不久後播出美國軍人死亡的畫面被拖到摩加迪沙（Mogadishu）街道，克林頓總統的撤軍決定，似乎證實有線電視新聞網的影響力。今天，隨著「一週7天、一天24小時」的新聞網絡的擴散，線電視新聞網單獨的影響已經減弱。因此，本文「美國有線電視新聞效應」的目的，就是所有即時新聞報導集體影響的同義詞。
The advent of real time news coverage has led to immediate public awareness and scrutiny of strategic decisions and military operations as they unfold. Is this a net positive or negative gain for strategic leaders and warfighters? The military welcomes the awareness but is leery of the scrutiny. The information age fourth estate’s vast resources offer commanders exceptional opportunities. Yet, the media gets mixed reviews from the military. Many in the military view the intrusion of the media as a potential operational risk and, perhaps, a career risk. But, the military needs the media to keep Americans informed and engaged in order to garner public support for their operations. At best, the CNN effect seems to be viewed as a double-edged sword, both as a strategic enabler and a potential operational risk.
即時新聞報導的來臨，導致即時的公眾意識並監督戰略決策和軍事作戰。對於戰略領導人和作戰者而言，這算是一個純正面或負增益呢？軍方歡迎公眾意識，但對監督有些猜疑。資訊時代第四權的龐大資源提供指揮官特殊的機會。然而，媒體獲得來自軍方褒貶不一的評語。軍方許多人將媒體的入侵視為一種潛在的作戰風險，或許是事業風險。但是，為爭取人民支持軍事作戰，軍方需要媒體以保持美國人民知的權利及其參與。美國有線電視新聞網效應充其量似乎可視為一把雙刃劍，既能創造推動戰略有利條件，也存在著潛在的作戰風險。
This paper will begin with an analysis of the evolution of the military-media relationship in the television age. This will provide the basis for some important insights on why the military and the media have such a tenuous relationship. In spite of such a relationship, this paper will argue that the military needs the media now more than ever. Thus, strategic leaders and senior warfighters must explore how they can best use the media as an enabler while mitigating potential operational risks.
本文首先將分析電視時代軍方與媒體關係的演變，提供為何軍方和媒體有這樣一種微妙的關係的見解基礎。儘管存在這種關係，本文將證明軍方現在比以往更需要媒體。因此，戰略領導人和資深作戰者必須探索它們如何能夠善用媒體成為推動者，同時減少潛在的作戰風險。
MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONS: A LOOK BACK
While there is—or should be—a natural convergence of interests in providing to the public accurate information about our armed forces and what they do, there is at the same time an inherent clash of interests (especially acute when men are fighting and dying) between military leaders responsible for success in battle and for the lives of their commands, and a media intensely competitive in providing readers and viewers with quick and vivid ‘news’ and opinion.
－General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret)
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
軍方與媒體的關係之回顧：
雖然將我們軍隊及其所作所為，提供準確的訊息給社會大眾，有（或應該有）自然的共同利益，但同時負責戰役成功，以及為生命的指揮的軍事領導人，以及在競爭激烈、提供讀者和觀眾快速而生動的新聞和輿論的媒體之間，存有內在的利益衝突（特別是當軍人戰鬥和死亡尤為劇烈）。
安德魯德帕斯特將軍，美國前歐洲盟軍最高司令（退役）。
If one views the media as representing the people in Clausewitz’s trinity (of the people, the military and the government) the first half of General Goodpaster’s statement regarding a “natural convergence of interests” rings true. In a perfect world, with the media serving as the lens for the American people, the military needs the media to ensure equilibrium among the people, its elected officials, and its subordinate military. Yet, General Goodpaster’s reference to a clash of interests is also true. The media, though committed to getting the story right, is also in the business of reporting exciting news that sells. And it is this “clash” that has stymied the military-media relationship, especially since the advent of television.
如果有人在克勞塞維茲的三位一體（人民、軍隊和政府）中將媒體視為代表人民，德帕斯特將軍的前半段關於「自然的共同利益」論述則屬實。在一個完美的世界，媒體充當美國人民的鏡頭，軍方需要媒體，以確保在人民、其民選官員，以及所屬軍隊之間的平衡。然而，德帕斯特將軍提及的利益衝突也是事實。媒體雖然致力於報導的正確性，也報導刺激而賣錢的消息。尤其是自電視問世以來，正是這種「衝突」阻礙軍方與媒體的關係。
Though this new technology “should” have brought the military closer to its policy-makers and the people, it did not. The confluence of events, with a TV in every living room, a failed policy in Vietnam, and a lost war, served to sharply divide the military and the media. This painful experience planted seeds of hatred in the military toward the media that permeated the military culture for decades. COL (Ret.) Henry Gole, writing about attitudes of Army War College students in the 1980’s, wrote, “Some 20 years after their experience in Vietnam, student attitudes toward the media were overwhelmingly negative and seemingly permanent, at least in that generation of embittered officers.” Later, in 1990, LTG (Ret.) Bernard Trainor noted that generations of officers (those at service academies in the 80s) who were in diapers during Vietnam also disdained the media. According to Trainor, “The credo of the military seems to have become ‘duty, honor, country, and hate the media’.”
雖然這項新技術「應該會」使軍方更接近其決策者以及人民，但卻沒有。在每個客廳電視匯集新聞事件，越南的失敗政策以及戰爭失利，嚴重分化軍方和媒體。這個慘痛的經驗種下軍方對媒體仇恨的種子，在軍方文化中瀰漫十年。亨利高爾（退役）上校，對於1980年的陸軍戰爭學院學生的態度寫道：「越戰的經歷後約20幾年，學生對媒體一面倒負面的態度看似永久的，至少在這一代憤怒的軍官。」之後在1990年，伯納德銓那（退役）中將指出，（這些在80年代就讀軍事院校）在越戰時還在包尿布的幾代軍官，也鄙視媒體。依據銓那所說，軍隊的信條似乎已經成為「責任、榮譽、國家和仇恨媒體」。
In addition to the “clash” between military and media objectives, there is a cultural cleavage that some would say is sharpened by having an all-volunteer force. Joe Galloway of U.S. News & World Report calls the cultural gap, “a struggle between the ‘anarchists’ and the ‘control freaks’.” The military want to control, as much as possible, everything on the battlefield or area of operations. On the other hand, the reporters want unfettered access to all aspects of the operation. Commanders worry over leaks of information that might compromise an operation. Keeping secrets is anathema to a reporter. Exacerbating these divergent tendencies are the different personalities the two professions attract. The military attracts people who follow the rules; the media attracts those who thrive on “less is more” when it comes to establishing rules for reporting. Nonetheless, both media and military share a commitment to American freedoms and neither wants a news story to be the cause of a single American soldier’s death.
除了軍方和傳媒目標之間的「衝突」之外，還有一種文化分裂，有些人會說是因為全志願役部隊組成而壁壘分明。美國新聞與世界報導的喬洛韋稱之為文化差距，是「無政府主義者」和「控制狂」之間的鬥爭。軍方想要盡可能地對戰場或戰區的一切控制，另一方面，記者想不受限制地進入各方的軍事作戰。指揮官擔心洩露資訊可能與軍事作戰妥協，保密是對記者的詛咒。使這些不同傾向的加劇惡化，是不同性格的兩個行業間的吸引。軍方吸引遵守規則的人，媒體吸引那些當論及建立報導規則時，興起「求質不求量，事半功倍」想法的人。然而，無論是媒體與軍方對美國的自由都有共同承擔的義務，都不想讓新聞報導導致任何一位美國士兵的死亡。
While military-media relations changed over the last half-century, information age warfare has changed and the nature of military deployments has also changed. The next several paragraphs will review the military-media evolution from the Vietnam War to today’s peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions.
雖然軍方與媒體的關係在過去半世紀已有改變，資訊化戰爭時代已經改變，軍事部署的本質也有改變。接下來幾個段落將檢討從越戰到今天的維和與人道主義援助任務，軍方與媒體的演變。
VIETNAM (1961-75)
The light shone by the media is not the regular sweep of the lighthouse, but a random searchlight directed at the whim of its controllers. .Douglas Hurd The war in Vietnam was a seminal event in military-media relations. It marked the first television coverage of war and a monumental shift in relations between the media and the American military. It also marks the last time reporters enjoyed unfettered access and no censorship in an American war. Americans saw battle scenes with real soldiers, not John Wayne or Errol Flynn, but real soldiers as actors on the screen. Said one American infantryman in Vietnam in 1965, “Cameras. That’s all I see wherever I look. Sometimes, I’m not sure whether I’m a soldier or an extra in a bad movie.” The evening network news brought images of American soldiers killing, American soldiers being wounded and killed, displaced civilians, and destroyed Vietnam villages into American living rooms on a nightly basis. These images were more powerful than any print medium could ever be. And these images were America’s first experience with “real” war images since no war had been fought on American soil since the Civil War.
越南（1961年至1975年）
媒體所照耀的光線，並非是由經常打掃的燈塔發出的，而是由其主管像隨機的探照燈般突然興起的指揮。－道格拉斯赫德
越戰是軍方與媒體關係獲得開展的大事件，標榜電視首次直播戰爭以及媒體和美國軍方關係的巨大轉變，也明顯表明最後一次記者在美國戰爭中享受不受限制而且沒有新聞檢查。美國人看到實兵戰鬥場面，不是約翰韋恩（John Wayne）或艾洛弗林（Errol Flynn）等電影演員，而是真正的軍人在大螢幕上擔任演員。1965年，一位美國步兵在越南說，「無論我看到哪裡，到處都看到照相機。有時候，我不確定我是否是個軍人，或者是一部爛電影裡的臨時演員。」晚間新聞網傳來美國士兵喪生影像、美國士兵受傷以及喪命、流離失所的平民、摧毀村莊越南，每夜進入美國人的客廳，這些影像比任何印刷媒體有更強大的影響力。因為自內戰以來美國本土沒有對過戰爭，這些影像是美國初次體驗「真實的」戰爭影像。
Prior to the Vietnam war, the American press had generally supported national war efforts and the national leadership with positive stories. The Vietnam war was the first time that reporters reported on American units that lacked discipline, used drugs on the battlefield, and had US soldiers questioning war aims while the war was ongoing. These stories, though factual, were viewed by the military as “negative.” Moreover, the uniformed leadership viewed these stories as a major reason they were losing the war at home while they were winning the battles in Vietnam.
越戰之前，美國新聞界普遍以正面報導支持國家戰爭的的努力和國家領導。越戰是記者首次報導缺乏紀律的美國部隊，在戰場上濫用藥物，而且美軍在正在進行的戰爭當中質疑戰爭的目的。這些報導雖然是真實的，卻被軍方認為是「負面」。而且，身著制服的領導階層將這些報導，視為他們在越南贏得戰役，卻在國內戰爭失利的主要原因。
In a war without front lines, reporters reported on wherever they could get transportation to and whatever happened there.8 This kind of reporting led military leaders to feel as though coverage was random and, when negative, biased. Reporters viewed the official version of the war reported at the nightly “Five O’Clock Follies” with disdain as they had seen a very different picture out on the battlefield that same day. This fueled the media’s skepticism and distrust of military leaders and government officials by most reporters covering the war.
在一場沒有前線的戰爭，記者報導交通可達之處以及所發生的任何事情。這種報導方式當有負面與偏見發生時，讓軍方領導人感到彷彿是隨機報導，記者很不屑地看待在每晚播出「五點鐘傻瓜會」的戰爭官方版報導，因為他們同一天在戰場上看到非常不同的景況。如此激發由多數記者採訪戰爭的媒體，對軍方領導人和政府官員的懷疑和不信任。
The media’s enormous negative coverage of the Tet offensive marked the turning point in the Vietnam war and, as such, became the basis for heated debate as to whether the military or the media lost the Vietnam war. Future General Colin Powell, then a Command and General Staff College student, recalled seeing these images:
媒體的大量負面報導農曆新年發動大規模的突襲攻勢，標示著越戰的轉折點，因此成為激烈辯論的基礎，乃至於演變為是軍方或媒體在越戰失利的場面。當時還是指揮和參謀學院的學生，而未來成為將軍的鮑威爾，回憶看到的這些景象說：
The morning of February 1st 1968 I came out of the bedroom, put on the coffee pot and turned on the TV news. I was stunned. There on the screen were American GIs fighting on the grounds of the US Embassy and ARVN (South Vietnamese) forces battling for the Presidential Palace in the heart of Saigon. The Viet Cong, supported by North Vietnamese army units, had launched a coordinated strike against 108 of South Vietnam’s provincial and district capitals. When I went to class that day the atmosphere was one of disbelief as if we had taken a punch in the gut. Fighting over the next few days continued to be fierce and twenty-six days passed before Hue was liberated. By then, the lovely former capital where I had served lay in ruins, with at least 2,800 of its people executed by the enemy…. The images beamed into American living-rooms of a once faceless capital had a profound effect on public opinion. Tet marked a turning-point, raising doubts in the minds of moderate Americans, not just hippies and campus radicals, about the worth of this conflict and the antiwar movement intensified.
在1968年2月1日早上，我從臥室出來，放下咖啡壺，並打開電視新聞，我大感震驚。螢幕上出現美國大兵因美國大使館的理由打仗，越南共和國陸軍（南越）部隊在西貢中心的總統府奮戰。北越部隊支持的越共，發起協同打擊南越的省會和地區的首府108次。我上課那天的氣氛仍是如同內臟遭受重擊般地難以置信。之後幾天的戰鬥持續非常激烈，26天過後順化市才被解放。屆時，我曾服務過的可愛前首都變成一片廢墟，至少有2800個人民遭敵軍處死…。這個曾經是匿名的首都的畫面播送到美國人的客廳，對輿論產生深刻影響。農曆新年的攻擊標示著一個轉折點，不僅是嬉皮和校園激進份子，在溫和的美國人心中引發對此衝突的價值的疑問以及反戰運動加劇。
