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自越戰發生美國第一場電視媒體戰爭以來，軍方和媒體雙方關係都已顯著改善。從越南戰爭開始，指揮官必須面對新的挑戰－面對電視鏡頭指揮其所屬單位。今天，戰略領導人可能會發現自己必須在全球舞台永遠閃爍的直播鏡頭前指揮命令。由於一週7天、一天24小時的衛星技術及其擴散，在戰略決策層面和作戰指揮方式上，已形成並增加所謂「美國有線電視新聞網效應」。軍方必須全面理解、準確預期並為這一新的動力計劃。本文紀錄自越戰到今天軍方與媒體的關係，並探討從越南到今天媒體作為潛在作戰風險以及創造戰略條件來源，未來軍方和媒體的磨擦將在一定程度上繼續發生。儘管這樣，戰略領導人和戰鬥人員必須充分利用日益強大的第四權，成為一項戰略推動者，而避免其作戰風險。

THE CNN EFFECT: STRATEGIC ENABLER OR OPERATIONAL RISK?

The process by which warfighters assemble information, analyze it, make decisions, and direct their commands has challenged men since the beginning of warfare. Beginning with the Vietnam War, commanders faced a new challenge. directing their units before a television camera. And today, commanders at all levels can count on operating “24/7”1 on a global stage

before a live camera that never blinks. Naturally, this changed environment will have a profound effect on how strategic leaders make their decisions and how warfighters direct their commands.

美國有線電視新聞網效應：創造戰略有利條件或徒增作戰風險？

自戰爭之始，作戰者收集資訊、分析、作決策，並直接指揮命令的過程，已對人形成挑戰。從越戰開始，指揮官面對新的挑戰－面對電視鏡頭指揮其所屬單位。而今天，各級指揮官可以在全球舞台前，指望經營「一週7天、一天24小時」永遠閃爍的照相機。當然，這個環境的變化，對戰略領導人如何作出他們的決策和作戰者如何指揮命令產生深刻影響。

The impact of this kind of media coverage has been dubbed “The CNN effect.” The term was born in controversy. President Bush’s decision to place troops in Somalia after viewing media coverage of starving refugees was sharply questioned. Were American interests really at stake? Was CNN deciding where the military goes next? Less than a year later, shortly following the broadcast pictures of a dead American serviceman being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, President Clinton’s decision to withdraw US troops seemed to confirm the power of CNN. Today, with the proliferation of “24/7” news networks, the impact of CNN alone has been diminished. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, “The CNN effect” is synonymous with the collective impact of all real time news coverage.

這種媒體報導的影響，已被稱為「美國有線電視新聞效應」。這個名詞產生於爭議。布希總統的決定將軍隊派駐在索馬利亞，在觀看媒體報導難民挨餓後，而遭受尖銳的質疑。當時美國利益真的是在危及關頭嗎？美國有線電視新聞網在決定軍隊下一步怎麼走嗎？不到一年後，不久後播出美國軍人死亡的畫面被拖到摩加迪沙（Mogadishu）街道，克林頓總統的撤軍決定，似乎證實有線電視新聞網的影響力。今天，隨著「一週7天、一天24小時」的新聞網絡的擴散，線電視新聞網單獨的影響已經減弱。因此，本文「美國有線電視新聞效應」的目的，就是所有即時新聞報導集體影響的同義詞。

The advent of real time news coverage has led to immediate public awareness and scrutiny of strategic decisions and military operations as they unfold. Is this a net positive or negative gain for strategic leaders and warfighters? The military welcomes the awareness but is leery of the scrutiny. The information age fourth estate’s vast resources offer commanders exceptional opportunities. Yet, the media gets mixed reviews from the military. Many in the military view the intrusion of the media as a potential operational risk and, perhaps, a career risk. But, the military needs the media to keep Americans informed and engaged in order to garner public support for their operations. At best, the CNN effect seems to be viewed as a double-edged sword, both as a strategic enabler and a potential operational risk.

即時新聞報導的來臨，導致即時的公眾意識並監督戰略決策和軍事作戰。對於戰略領導人和作戰者而言，這算是一個純正面或負增益呢？軍方歡迎公眾意識，但對監督有些猜疑。資訊時代第四權的龐大資源提供指揮官特殊的機會。然而，媒體獲得來自軍方褒貶不一的評語。軍方許多人將媒體的入侵視為一種潛在的作戰風險，或許是事業風險。但是，為爭取人民支持軍事作戰，軍方需要媒體以保持美國人民知的權利及其參與。美國有線電視新聞網效應充其量似乎可視為一把雙刃劍，既能創造推動戰略有利條件，也存在著潛在的作戰風險。

This paper will begin with an analysis of the evolution of the military-media relationship in the television age. This will provide the basis for some important insights on why the military and the media have such a tenuous relationship. In spite of such a relationship, this paper will argue that the military needs the media now more than ever. Thus, strategic leaders and senior warfighters must explore how they can best use the media as an enabler while mitigating potential operational risks.

本文首先將分析電視時代軍方與媒體關係的演變，提供為何軍方和媒體有這樣一種微妙的關係的見解基礎。儘管存在這種關係，本文將證明軍方現在比以往更需要媒體。因此，戰略領導人和資深作戰者必須探索它們如何能夠善用媒體成為推動者，同時減少潛在的作戰風險。

MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONS: A LOOK BACK

While there is—or should be—a natural convergence of interests in providing to the public accurate information about our armed forces and what they do, there is at the same time an inherent clash of interests (especially acute when men are fighting and dying) between military leaders responsible for success in battle and for the lives of their commands, and a media intensely competitive in providing readers and viewers with quick and vivid ‘news’ and opinion.

－General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret)

Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

軍方與媒體的關係之回顧：

雖然將我們軍隊及其所作所為，提供準確的訊息給社會大眾，有（或應該有）自然的共同利益，但同時負責戰役成功，以及為生命的指揮的軍事領導人，以及在競爭激烈、提供讀者和觀眾快速而生動的新聞和輿論的媒體之間，存有內在的利益衝突（特別是當軍人戰鬥和死亡尤為劇烈）。

安德魯德帕斯特將軍，美國前歐洲盟軍最高司令（退役）。

If one views the media as representing the people in Clausewitz’s trinity (of the people, the military and the government) the first half of General Goodpaster’s statement regarding a “natural convergence of interests” rings true. In a perfect world, with the media serving as the lens for the American people, the military needs the media to ensure equilibrium among the people, its elected officials, and its subordinate military. Yet, General Goodpaster’s reference to a clash of interests is also true. The media, though committed to getting the story right, is also in the business of reporting exciting news that sells. And it is this “clash” that has stymied the military-media relationship, especially since the advent of television.

如果有人在克勞塞維茲的三位一體（人民、軍隊和政府）中將媒體視為代表人民，德帕斯特將軍的前半段關於「自然的共同利益」論述則屬實。在一個完美的世界，媒體充當美國人民的鏡頭，軍方需要媒體，以確保在人民、其民選官員，以及所屬軍隊之間的平衡。然而，德帕斯特將軍提及的利益衝突也是事實。媒體雖然致力於報導的正確性，也報導刺激而賣錢的消息。尤其是自電視問世以來，正是這種「衝突」阻礙軍方與媒體的關係。

Though this new technology “should” have brought the military closer to its policy-makers and the people, it did not. The confluence of events, with a TV in every living room, a failed policy in Vietnam, and a lost war, served to sharply divide the military and the media. This painful experience planted seeds of hatred in the military toward the media that permeated the military culture for decades. COL (Ret.) Henry Gole, writing about attitudes of Army War College students in the 1980’s, wrote, “Some 20 years after their experience in Vietnam, student attitudes toward the media were overwhelmingly negative and seemingly permanent, at least in that generation of embittered officers.” Later, in 1990, LTG (Ret.) Bernard Trainor noted that generations of officers (those at service academies in the 80s) who were in diapers during Vietnam also disdained the media. According to Trainor, “The credo of the military seems to have become ‘duty, honor, country, and hate the media’.”

雖然這項新技術「應該會」使軍方更接近其決策者以及人民，但卻沒有。在每個客廳電視匯集新聞事件，越南的失敗政策以及戰爭失利，嚴重分化軍方和媒體。這個慘痛的經驗種下軍方對媒體仇恨的種子，在軍方文化中瀰漫十年。亨利高爾（退役）上校，對於1980年的陸軍戰爭學院學生的態度寫道：「越戰的經歷後約20幾年，學生對媒體一面倒負面的態度看似永久的，至少在這一代憤怒的軍官。」之後在1990年，伯納德銓那（退役）中將指出，（這些在80年代就讀軍事院校）在越戰時還在包尿布的幾代軍官，也鄙視媒體。依據銓那所說，軍隊的信條似乎已經成為「責任、榮譽、國家和仇恨媒體」。

In addition to the “clash” between military and media objectives, there is a cultural cleavage that some would say is sharpened by having an all-volunteer force. Joe Galloway of U.S. News & World Report calls the cultural gap, “a struggle between the ‘anarchists’ and the ‘control freaks’.” The military want to control, as much as possible, everything on the battlefield or area of operations. On the other hand, the reporters want unfettered access to all aspects of the operation. Commanders worry over leaks of information that might compromise an operation. Keeping secrets is anathema to a reporter. Exacerbating these divergent tendencies are the different personalities the two professions attract. The military attracts people who follow the rules; the media attracts those who thrive on “less is more” when it comes to establishing rules for reporting. Nonetheless, both media and military share a commitment to American freedoms and neither wants a news story to be the cause of a single American soldier’s death.

除了軍方和傳媒目標之間的「衝突」之外，還有一種文化分裂，有些人會說是因為全志願役部隊組成而壁壘分明。美國新聞與世界報導的喬洛韋稱之為文化差距，是「無政府主義者」和「控制狂」之間的鬥爭。軍方想要盡可能地對戰場或戰區的一切控制，另一方面，記者想不受限制地進入各方的軍事作戰。指揮官擔心洩露資訊可能與軍事作戰妥協，保密是對記者的詛咒。使這些不同傾向的加劇惡化，是不同性格的兩個行業間的吸引。軍方吸引遵守規則的人，媒體吸引那些當論及建立報導規則時，興起「求質不求量，事半功倍」想法的人。然而，無論是媒體與軍方對美國的自由都有共同承擔的義務，都不想讓新聞報導導致任何一位美國士兵的死亡。

While military-media relations changed over the last half-century, information age warfare has changed and the nature of military deployments has also changed. The next several paragraphs will review the military-media evolution from the Vietnam War to today’s peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions.

雖然軍方與媒體的關係在過去半世紀已有改變，資訊化戰爭時代已經改變，軍事部署的本質也有改變。接下來幾個段落將檢討從越戰到今天的維和與人道主義援助任務，軍方與媒體的演變。

VIETNAM (1961-75)

The light shone by the media is not the regular sweep of the lighthouse, but a random searchlight directed at the whim of its controllers. .Douglas Hurd The war in Vietnam was a seminal event in military-media relations. It marked the first television coverage of war and a monumental shift in relations between the media and the American military. It also marks the last time reporters enjoyed unfettered access and no censorship in an American war. Americans saw battle scenes with real soldiers, not John Wayne or Errol Flynn, but real soldiers as actors on the screen. Said one American infantryman in Vietnam in 1965, “Cameras. That’s all I see wherever I look. Sometimes, I’m not sure whether I’m a soldier or an extra in a bad movie.” The evening network news brought images of American soldiers killing, American soldiers being wounded and killed, displaced civilians, and destroyed Vietnam villages into American living rooms on a nightly basis. These images were more powerful than any print medium could ever be. And these images were America’s first experience with “real” war images since no war had been fought on American soil since the Civil War.

越南（1961年至1975年）

媒體所照耀的光線，並非是由經常打掃的燈塔發出的，而是由其主管像隨機的探照燈般突然興起的指揮。－道格拉斯赫德

越戰是軍方與媒體關係獲得開展的大事件，標榜電視首次直播戰爭以及媒體和美國軍方關係的巨大轉變，也明顯表明最後一次記者在美國戰爭中享受不受限制而且沒有新聞檢查。美國人看到實兵戰鬥場面，不是約翰韋恩（John Wayne）或艾洛弗林（Errol Flynn）等電影演員，而是真正的軍人在大螢幕上擔任演員。1965年，一位美國步兵在越南說，「無論我看到哪裡，到處都看到照相機。有時候，我不確定我是否是個軍人，或者是一部爛電影裡的臨時演員。」晚間新聞網傳來美國士兵喪生影像、美國士兵受傷以及喪命、流離失所的平民、摧毀村莊越南，每夜進入美國人的客廳，這些影像比任何印刷媒體有更強大的影響力。因為自內戰以來美國本土沒有對過戰爭，這些影像是美國初次體驗「真實的」戰爭影像。

Prior to the Vietnam war, the American press had generally supported national war efforts and the national leadership with positive stories. The Vietnam war was the first time that reporters reported on American units that lacked discipline, used drugs on the battlefield, and had US soldiers questioning war aims while the war was ongoing. These stories, though factual, were viewed by the military as “negative.” Moreover, the uniformed leadership viewed these stories as a major reason they were losing the war at home while they were winning the battles in Vietnam.

越戰之前，美國新聞界普遍以正面報導支持國家戰爭的的努力和國家領導。越戰是記者首次報導缺乏紀律的美國部隊，在戰場上濫用藥物，而且美軍在正在進行的戰爭當中質疑戰爭的目的。這些報導雖然是真實的，卻被軍方認為是「負面」。而且，身著制服的領導階層將這些報導，視為他們在越南贏得戰役，卻在國內戰爭失利的主要原因。

In a war without front lines, reporters reported on wherever they could get transportation to and whatever happened there.8 This kind of reporting led military leaders to feel as though coverage was random and, when negative, biased. Reporters viewed the official version of the war reported at the nightly “Five O’Clock Follies” with disdain as they had seen a very different picture out on the battlefield that same day. This fueled the media’s skepticism and distrust of military leaders and government officials by most reporters covering the war.

在一場沒有前線的戰爭，記者報導交通可達之處以及所發生的任何事情。這種報導方式當有負面與偏見發生時，讓軍方領導人感到彷彿是隨機報導，記者很不屑地看待在每晚播出「五點鐘傻瓜會」的戰爭官方版報導，因為他們同一天在戰場上看到非常不同的景況。如此激發由多數記者採訪戰爭的媒體，對軍方領導人和政府官員的懷疑和不信任。

The media’s enormous negative coverage of the Tet offensive marked the turning point in the Vietnam war and, as such, became the basis for heated debate as to whether the military or the media lost the Vietnam war. Future General Colin Powell, then a Command and General Staff College student, recalled seeing these images:

媒體的大量負面報導農曆新年發動大規模的突襲攻勢，標示著越戰的轉折點，因此成為激烈辯論的基礎，乃至於演變為是軍方或媒體在越戰失利的場面。當時還是指揮和參謀學院的學生，而未來成為將軍的鮑威爾，回憶看到的這些景象說：

The morning of February 1st 1968 I came out of the bedroom, put on the coffee pot and turned on the TV news. I was stunned. There on the screen were American GIs fighting on the grounds of the US Embassy and ARVN (South Vietnamese) forces battling for the Presidential Palace in the heart of Saigon. The Viet Cong, supported by North Vietnamese army units, had launched a coordinated strike against 108 of South Vietnam’s provincial and district capitals. When I went to class that day the atmosphere was one of disbelief as if we had taken a punch in the gut. Fighting over the next few days continued to be fierce and twenty-six days passed before Hue was liberated. By then, the lovely former capital where I had served lay in ruins, with at least 2,800 of its people executed by the enemy…. The images beamed into American living-rooms of a once faceless capital had a profound effect on public opinion. Tet marked a turning-point, raising doubts in the minds of moderate Americans, not just hippies and campus radicals, about the worth of this conflict and the antiwar movement intensified.

在1968年2月1日早上，我從臥室出來，放下咖啡壺，並打開電視新聞，我大感震驚。螢幕上出現美國大兵因美國大使館的理由打仗，越南共和國陸軍（南越）部隊在西貢中心的總統府奮戰。北越部隊支持的越共，發起協同打擊南越的省會和地區的首府108次。我上課那天的氣氛仍是如同內臟遭受重擊般地難以置信。之後幾天的戰鬥持續非常激烈，26天過後順化市才被解放。屆時，我曾服務過的可愛前首都變成一片廢墟，至少有2800個人民遭敵軍處死…。這個曾經是匿名的首都的畫面播送到美國人的客廳，對輿論產生深刻影響。農曆新年的攻擊標示著一個轉折點，不僅是嬉皮和校園激進份子，在溫和的美國人心中引發對此衝突的價值的疑問以及反戰運動加劇。